Dozier v. Commonwealth,
253 S.E.2d 655 (Va. 1979)

Conviction reversed where prosecutrix had made written statement which did not refer to alleged rape and did not refer to defendant by name. Statement was constitutionally material to charges, in that it affected credibility of the witness, even though the written account of the abduction was substantially consistent with the prosecutrix's testimony at trial. Failure of Commonwealth to disclose pursuant to defendant's request required new trial.

Deatrick v. State,
392 N.E.2d 498 (Ind.Ct.App. 1979)

New trial ordered where, in response to defendant's request, prosecutor and codefendant denied existence of a "deal" for codefendant's testimony, and on direct exam prosecutor elicited denial from codefendant that any promises for his testimony were made. Prior to trial prosecutor made promises and wrote a letter to parole board. This could have affected verdict, especially considering eyewitnesses' were inability to identify faces of perpetrators and prosecutor's repeated emphasis of codefendant's sincerity.

State v. Fullwood,
262 S.E.2d 10 (S.C. 1979)

Where defendant pled self-defense when victim attacked him with a knife and cut him, where investigating officer, who was asked for disclosure, falsely told counsel that he had no information beneficial to defendant, and where prosecutor argued several times that victim had no knife although he had knife in his possession during the trial, concealment of the knife deprived defendant of fundamental fairness in his trial.

State v. Goodson,
277 S.E.2d 602 (S.C. 1981)

In prosecution for housebreaking, grand larceny and safecracking, state's failure to disclose existence of roll of film showing a person other defendant on premises where crime occurred deprived defendant of a fair trial, in that film could possibly cast serious doubt on credibility of state's only witness implicating the defendant.

People v. Angelini,
649 P.2d 341 (Colo.Ct.App.Div.III. 1982)

Where defendant requested tapes of prosecution's interviews with key prosecution witness, prosecution's failure to disclose that witness had been hypnotized on morning witness testified required new trial.

State v. Perkins,
423 So.2d 1103 (La. 1982)

Reversed under Brady where State failed to disclose statement of eyewitness, which substantially corroborated defendant's version of shooting, despite defendant's request of a copy of any statements of any person interviewed by agent of State in connection with subject matter of case. Statement might have affected outcome as to either guilt or punishment.

Granger v. State,
653 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.App. 13 Dist. 1983), aff'd, 683 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012 (1985)

Life sentence reversed where prosecutor, judge, and witness's counsel all failed to disclose existence of a deal that changed witness's sentence from death to life. Also, because prosecution failed to correct the witness's testimony regarding the deal, her testimony from the first trial was not admissible at the second, after she refused to testify, because defendant's right to cross-examine her had been violated.

Commonwealth v. Wallace,
455 A.2d 1187 (Pa. 1983)

Prosecution failed to correct false statements by its key witness and suppressed parts of his criminal record. Defense made numerous requests for full disclosure of the witness's criminal record and the prosecution repeatedly failed to deliver.

Smith v. Zant,
301 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. 1983)

Napue and Giglio violated where prosecution told jury that witness was not promised anything for his testimony when in fact he was threatened with death penalty if he failed to testify, and given life sentence in exchange for his testimony.

Binsz v. State,
675 P.2d 448 (Okl.Cr. 1984)

Convictions and death sentence overturned where prosecution tried to avoid telling the jury of key witness's leniency deal by keeping the witness ignorant of the bargain struck with her counsel.

Knight v. State,
478 So.2d 332 (Ala.Crim.App. 1985)

Evidence that both defendant and rape victim were A and H secretors (substances in saliva), and that person who smoked cigarettes found ground out on victim's card table was an H secretor, was clearly favorable to defendant's claim of innocence, and State's failure to disclose such evidence was a due process violation.

People v. Buckley,
501 N.Y.S.2d 554 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1986)

Updated rap sheet on prosecution witness, showing disposition of a charge not appearing on sheet given to defense was material which prosecution was obligated to disclose to defense.

Cipollina v. State,
501 So.2d 2 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1986), review denied, 509 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 1987)

State committed Brady violation by failing to inform defense counsel of name and address of witness who obtained alibi information for defendant from codefendant in prison, even though State had informed defense that same witness had inculpated codefendant.

Bloodworth v. State,
512 A.2d 1056 (Md. 1986)

Under Bagley, exculpatory material does not have to be in the prosecutor's possession. Here, fact that prosecutors were not in physical possession of detective's report of another possible suspect with respect to three offenses was immaterial to whether failure to disclose report to defendant was Brady violation.

State v. Wyche,
518 A.2d 907 (R.I. 1986)

Prosecutor's failure to disclose existence of blood test, which indicated that sexual assault victim's blood-alcohol concentration was .208, was deliberate, violated due process and Brady, and required new trial, where prosecutor knew of test results on evening before testimony of physician, who knew about test, and where prosecutor made no disclosure of test until guilty verdict.

State v. Osborne,
345 S.E.2d 256 (S.C.App. 1986), aff'd as modified, 353 S.E.2d 276 (S.C. 1987)

Nondisclosure, despite timely Brady motions prior to trial, of two recorded statements by State's primary witness, who was a heavy alcohol and drug user, had long criminal record, and had changed his story to an eyewitness account in exchange for near immunity, denied defendants due process, where verdict was questionable, and defense counsels' cross-exam might well have shifted weight of evidence to establish reasonable doubt had State complied with motion.

State v. Smith,
504 So.2d 1070 (La.Ct.App. 1987)

Defendant should have been permitted in camera inspection of alleged prior statement of victim for material inconsistencies or Brady information, in light of defendant's specific requests for such statements, which were based on differences between opening statement and victim's testimony.

Ex parte Womack,
541 So.2d 47 (Ala. 1988)

Conviction reversed where prosecution failed to disclose: (1) transcript of a meeting with a witness who recanted his grand jury testimony and attempted to implicate himself in the crime, only to be dissuaded by his counsel and the district attorney; (2) plea arrangements with two witnesses; (3) police reports and memos which included prior inconsistent statements and jailhouse confessions.

State v. Johnston,
529 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 1988)

Conviction and death sentence reversed where prosecution failed to disclose evidence which undermined its theory of where the murder occurred and who did it.

Ham v. State,
760 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)

Conviction reversed where state failed to turn over evidence, following Brady request, of chief medical examiner's testimony which tended to confirm defense expert's position and draw into question the state's evidence of defendant's guilt.

Ex parte Brown,
548 So.2d 993 (Ala. 1989)

Conviction reversed where state failed to disclose, until introduction at trial, physical evidence which contradicted victim's statement despite the granting of defense's motion requiring disclosure of tangible evidence expected to be introduced at trial.

Ex parte Adams,
768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.Cr.App. 1989)

Conviction reversed where prosecution suppressed prior inconsistent statements of its key witnesses. These statements seriously eroded the credibility of both witnesses.

Bevill v. State,
556 So.2d 699 (Miss. 1990)

Conviction and death sentence reversed where defense was not allowed to adduce at trial whether prosecution helped its key witness to have one of his prior convictions expunged in exchange for his testimony.

People v. Ramos,
550 N.Y.S.2d 784 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1990)

Failure of prosecutor to turn over criminal record of prosecution witness was an inexcusable Brady violation requiring reversal. Defense counsel was not required to make a specific request because prosecutor had made an affirmative specific representation as to the specific Brady material.

Perdomo v. State,
565 So.2d 1375 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1990)

Trial court should have held Richardson hearing on potential Brady violation and its potential to prejudice defendant where potentially exculpatory evidence might still be in state custody, even though state did not disclose evidence because it believed it had been stolen.

State v. Davis,
823 S.W.2d 217 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1991)

Drunk driving conviction reversed where state failed to disclose police department memoranda revealing knowledge of incorrect readings, malfunctions, and tampering with intoxilizer machine; although evidence also included police observations of defendant, the intoxilizer was central to the state's case.

Commonwealth v. Santiago,
591 A.2d 1095 (Pa.Super. 1991), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 953 (Pa. 1991)

Because the point of the disclosure requirement is to ensure a fair trial, the trial judge had an obligation to disclose to the defense prior inconsistent statements made in camera by prosecution witness.

People v. Godina,
584 N.E.2d 523 (Ill.App. 1991), appeal denied, 591 N.E.2d 26 (Ill. 1992)

Second-degree murder conviction reversed where pending burglary prosecution of state's witness was material and thus subject to disclosure under Brady where the witness' testimony assisted state in convicting defendant.

State v. Knapper,
579 So.2d 956 (La. 1991)

Reversed where prosecution failed to disclose a police report in which eyewitness gave description of murderer's clothes which was opposite that of chief state witness. The report also mentioned another group of men who were committing crimes that night, one of whom was found in possession of the murder weapon.

People v. Janota,
181 A.D.2d 932 (N.Y.App.Div. 1992)

Rape conviction reversed due to prosecution's delay in turning over notes of complainant's initial version of the incident which would have brought her credibility into serious question. Counsel found out about the notes after he had cross-examined her for a day and a half, and did not recall her for fear such a move would be seen as harassment.

Commonwealth v. Moose,
602 A.2d 1265 (Pa. 1992)

Murder conviction reversed where state failed to disclose deal with jailhouse snitch despite a general request by the defense. Defendant's failure to seek criminal records of state witnesses was directly traceable to state's failure to identify the prisoner.

Savage v. State,
600 So.2d 405 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992), cert. denied, 600 So.2d 409 (Ala. 1992)

Manslaughter conviction reversed where prosecutor failed, in violation of Brady, to disclose statements of two witnesses who said defendant acted in self-defense; statements were arguably exculpatory and could have been used to impeach the testimony of the witnesses at trial.

People v. Jackson,
154 Misc.2d 718 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1992), aff'd, 603 N.Y.S.2d 410 (N.Y.Sup. 1992), appeal denied, 633 N.E.2d 487 (N.Y. 1994)

Convictions for second degree arson and six counts of felony murder reversed where detective and fire department, despite their independent duty to disclose under Brady, failed to reveal that it was the expert opinion of the detective that the fire was an accidental electrical fire.

People v. Clausell,
182 A.D.2d 132 (N.Y.App.Div. 1992)

Due process violated where prosecution failed to disclose a buy report in a drug prosecution until after conviction since defense specifically requested the report twice, officer's testimony was essential, and report contained useful impeachment material.

People v. Holmes,
606 N.E.2d 439 (Ill.App.1 Dist. 1992), appeal denied, 612 N.E.2d 518 (Ill. 1993)

Conviction reversed where prosecution told jury that chief witness was just an innocent bystander when in fact he participated in the crime, and violated Napue by lying about the benefits witness was to receive for his testimony.

Gorham v. State,
597 So.2d 782 (Fla. 1992)

Conviction and death sentence vacated where state failed to disclose that key witness had been a paid CI in defendant's case and in others. The fact that the witness had received substantial payments in other cases made the evidence material for challenging his credibility.

State v. Bryant,
415 S.E.2d 806 (S.C. 1992)

Once defendant has established basis for his claim that undisclosed evidence contains exculpatory material or impeachment evidence, State must produce undisclosed evidence for trial judge's inspection; trial judge should then rule on materiality of evidence to determine whether State must produce it for defendant's use.

McMillian v. State,
616 So.2d 933 (Ala.Cr.App. 1993)

Brady violated where prosecution failed to disclose: (1) earlier statements by its key witness claiming to know nothing about the crime and then argued to jury that witness had told same story from the beginning; (2) statement of fellow inmate who overheard key witness discussing plan to frame defendant.

People v. Davis,
614 N.E.2d 719 (N.Y. 1993)

Brady violated by failure to disclose, despite specific request, hospital records of third party whom complainant identified as one of his attackers, indicating that third party was admitted to hospital shortly before the attack.

Averhart v. State
614 N.E.2d 924 (Ind. 1993)

Negative results from gunshot residue tests that were withheld by the prosecution during trial were material at sentencing phase, even though they were not at the guilt phase. Although the test results did not establish that petitioner had not failed the fatal shot, "[t]he absence of gunshot residue . . . form[ed] part of a chain of circumstantial evidence pointing away from [petitioner] as the triggerman. Confidence in the manner in which the jury evaluated the aggravating circumstances with respect to [petitioner] cannot be maintained in this atmosphere."

Funk v. Commonwealth,
842 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1993)

Life sentence (state did seek death penalty) reversed where state failed to turn over various pieces of exculpatory hair and fiber evidence.

Jones v. State of Texas,
850 S.W.2d 223 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1993)

Conviction and sentence reversed where prosecution failed to timely disclose exculpatory, material information in a victim impact statement which tended to negate the only evidence of defendant's intent to shoot the victim.

State v. Spurlock,
874 S.W.2d 602 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1993)

Murder conviction reversed where prosecution failed to disclose: (1) statements, which had been taken by the sheriff's department, which stated or implied that someone else did the murder; and (2) audio and video recordings of key prosecution witness giving statement incriminating defendant after being promised he would be released from jail.

State v. Lindsey,
621 So.2d 618 (La.Ct.App. 1993)

Conviction reversed where state failed to disclose a promise to give accomplice favorable consideration if she testified credibly, and exacerbated the Brady violation by failing to correct the witness' assertion at trial that she was not expecting consideration.

Garcia v. State,
622 So.2d 1325 (Fla. 1993)

Conviction and death sentence reversed where prosecution failed to disclose statement to police given by a key prosecution witness which corroborated defendant's assertion that someone else committed the murder. Violation was compounded because prosecution denied the existence of the person defendant identified, despite the fact that police had arrested him and knew he was going by the name defendant gave them.

Swartz v. State,
506 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993)

PCR granted where state failed, in violation of Brady, to disclose evidence of alleged coperpetrator's threatening and overbearing nature, and where rebuttal witness, who was the only witness available to directly contradict defendant's compulsion testimony, falsely denied existence of a deal for his testimony.

People v. Garcia,
17 Cal.App.4th 1169 (Cal.Ct.App. 1993)

Habeas granted where state failed to disclose evidence that tended to impeach reliability of state's accident reconstruction expert, by showing that expert had used faulty methodology and made errors in other cases.

State v. Avelar,
859 P.2d 353 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993)

Prosecution's failure to disclose that party to whom cocaine was delivered could not identify defendant as one who delivered cocaine violated due process and required that conviction be set aside; disclosure would likely have altered defendant's trial strategy significantly.

People v. Steadman,
623 N.E.2d 509 (N.Y. 1993)

Convictions reversed under Brady where trial assistants, as representatives of DA's office, were chargeable with knowledge of promises made by assistant DA to prosecution witness' attorney for purposes of duty to disclose Brady material, and assistants were obligated to clarify record after witness falsely testified that no promises were made.

People v. Gaines,
604 N.Y.S.2d 272 (N.Y.App.Div. 1993)

Brady violation, which required reversal of convictions, occurred where prosecutor did not disclose cooperation agreement reached between trial assistant's superior and attorney for principal prosecution witness under which witness would not be required to go to prison on pending felony charges if he testified against defendant.

Burrows v. State,
438 S.E.2d 300 (Va.App. 1993)

Commonwealth's failure, in response to murder defendant's Brady request for exculpatory material, to provide defendant with information respecting Commonwealth witness' criminal past and apparent long-standing relationship with Commonwealth's attorneys, warranted new trial.

Ex parte Williams,
642 So.2d 391 (Ala. 1993)

Brady violated where state failed to produce lineup photographs from which victim had identified a person other than defendant, hat which had led police to that person, and statement in which victim had failed to mention supposedly identifying raincoat found in defendant's home.

Jefferson v. State,
645 So.2d 313 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994)

Brady violated where undisclosed exculpatory evidence was material to murder prosecution because it would have tended to show that someone other than defendant committed crime and would have been relevant to impeach credibility of two witnesses who testified for prosecution.

West v. State,
444 S.E.2d 398 (Ga.App. 1994)

Conviction reversed where State's failure to disclose tape recording of alleged drug deal involving defendant prior to trial violated due process; tape was exculpatory in that it might have shown that informant gave perjured testimony.

People v. White,
606 N.Y.S.2d 172 (N.Y.App.Div. 1994)

Convictions vacated under Brady and Rosario where undisclosed statement indicated that prosecution witness said he could not identify person who shot victim, while at trial he testified to knowing defendant vaguely and seeing him chase victim and fire weapon at him, and link of defendant to second murder was in significant part through ballistics evidence that same gun was used in both murders.

State v. Florez,
636 A.2d 1040 (N.J. 1994)

Conviction reversed where state failed to disclose fact that informant had been involved in reverse sting drug transaction, even though defendants knew he was involved in crime, but did not know he was an informer. This was material because the informer played a central role in setting up the drug deal.

State v. Landano,
637 A.2d 1270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994)

Brady violated where cop's handwritten notes indicating that witness rejected defendant's photo were suppressed, and only an official report saying witness failed to make an ID was disclosed.

Commonwealth v. Galloway,
640 A.2d 454 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)

Commonwealth's Brady violation in failing to disclose that its key witness' recollection was hypnotically refreshed prior to trial entitled defendant to new trial on one murder where witness was only one to testify that she saw him possess and shoot a gun, and one of two witnesses to testify that she heard defendant confess.

State v. White
640 A.2d 572 (Conn. 1994)

State's failure to disclose exculpatory Brady material prior to probable cause hearing mandated reversal of convictions and new probable cause hearing even though material was disclosed to defense during jury selection; although defendants made use of evidence, witnesses whose statements were initially not revealed were unavailable at time of trial.

Commonwealth v. Green,
640 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1994)

Conviction and death sentence reversed where state failed to disclose two out of court statements by co-conspirator in which she claimed she shot and killed a cop.

State v. Munson,
886 P.2d 999 (Okl.Cr. 1994)

New trial granted where state failed to disclose hypnosis of key prosecution witness, withheld over 165 exculpatory photographs and wilfully suppressed hundreds of pages of exculpatory reports.

State v. Perry,
879 S.W.2d 609 (Mo.Ct.App. 1994)

State's failure to disclose defendant's girlfriend's pretrial statement violated Brady where statement was directly contrary to girlfriend's trial testimony, supported claim that he was "framed" and confessed solely in response to police beating, he specifically requested statement, and defense did not know statement existed until after trial.

State v. Gilbert,
640 A.2d 61 (Conn. 1994)

Capital murder conviction reversed where state failed to disclose, after specific defense request, reports from victims' family and friends in which they said that two other individuals had been in the store earlier the same day---carrying guns and threatening to kill someone.

Jefferson v. State,
645 So.2d 313 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994)

Writ of error coram nobis granted where prosecution failed to disclose prior inconsistent statements of two witnesses who testified to seeing defendant fleeing the scene. Earlier statements identified the fleeing suspect as someone else.

Bowman v. Commonwealth,
445 S.E.2d 110 (Va. 1994)

Prosecution's failure to earlier disclose police officer's report violated Brady; had defendant been aware of discrepancies in police officer's report and officer's failure to mention defendant's facial scars, he could have strengthened his defense of mistaken identity. Trial court abused its discretion in refusing to review in camera police officer's report as requested by defendant.

People v. Rutter,
616 N.Y.S.2d 598 (N.Y.App.Div. 1994), opinion adhered to on reargument, 623 N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y.App.D. 1995)

Appellate counsel held ineffective for failing to raise and argue: (1) People's disclosure, on morning after key witness was excused, of transcript of polygraph in which this witness denied knowledge of the homicide as Rosario and Brady violation; and (2) failure of trial court to allow the witness to be recalled and cross-examined with the transcript.

State v. Gardner,
885 P.2d 1144 (Idaho Ct.App. 1994)

Defendant entitled to withdraw guilty plea where prosecutor violated Brady by failing to disclose eyewitness statement tending to show that collision and resulting death were caused by tire blowout, not by defendant's fatigue or drug use.

State v. Laurie,
653 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1995)

New Hampshire constitutional right to present all favorable evidence affords greater protection to criminal defendant than federal Brady standard; it requires state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that favorable evidence knowingly withheld would not have affected verdict.

People v. Curry,
627 N.Y.S.2d 214 (N.Y.App.Div. 1995)

Motion to withdraw guilty plea granted where state failed to disclose information about investigation into police corruption in violation of due process. Case would hinge on credibility contest of defendant and cop, who allegedly stole defendant's money during arrest, and DA had serious information about the cop's criminal activities.

People v. Wright,
635 N.Y.S.2d 136 (N.Y. 1995)

Alleged assault victim's status as police informant was material and favorable to defendant, and prosecution's failure, despite Brady requests, to reveal that alleged victim was informant denied defendant due process. If information had been revealed, defendant, could have presented it as motive for police to corroborate alleged victim's testimony and to disbelieve defendant's claim that she stabbed alleged victim because she believed he was going to rape her. Information also would have refuted state's explanation that victim did not want to go to hospital after stabbing because police would have thought he "did something" due to of his criminal record.

Jackson v. Commonwealth,
1995 WL 710112 (Va.App. 1995)

Conviction for abduction with intent to defile reversed where trial court erroneously failed to order state to disclose victim's statements to police. These statements contained information inconsistent with victim's testimony on several points. Because victim's credibility was the crucial issue in the case, nondisclosure of the statements deprived defendant of the opportunity to explore and expose victim's inconsistencies.

Kills On Top v. State
901 P.2d 1368 (Mont. 1995)

Confidence in the death sentence was undermined by the prosecution’s failure to disclose evidence related to a key guilt-phase witness that could have been used by the defense to challenge her credibility or argue bias. The undisclosed evidence concerned the witness’s criminal history and her allegation that she had been raped by a jailer.

People v. Jackson,
637 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y.App.Div. 1995)

State violated Brady in second-degree murder prosecution by failing for three years to disclose statements by learning-disabled witness who, by time of disclosure, had no substantive memory of many details of events at issue; statements' exculpatory value was evident on their face, as witness stated numerous times that defendant was outside apartment when shots were fired, and witness gave leads as to other possible perpetrators of crime.

Padgett v. State
668 So.2d 78 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995), cert. denied, 668 So.2d 88 (Ala. 1995)

Capital murder conviction is reversed due to the prosecution’s delayed disclosure of test results calling into question whether the blood sample allegedly provided by defendant, which was tied to the victim, had in fact come from defendant. Defendant’s opportunity to cross examine the serologist the afternoon he found out about the second test result was inadequate to cure the violation.

Hamilton v. State,
677 So.2d 1254 (Ala.Cr.App. 1995)

Conviction and death sentence reversed where key witness perjured himself with regard to statements he claimed were made by defendant regarding lack of remorse and pride resulting from the murder, and falsely denied the existence of a deal for his testimony. Police had led witness to believe he would be freed from jail in exchange for his testimony, and their actions were taken as part of the prosecution team, despite fact that prosecutor had no knowledge of the deal.

Brummett v. Commonwealth,
1996 WL 10209 (Va.App. Jan. 11, 1996)

Convictions on five counts of sexual crimes reversed where trial court erroneously failed to order disclosure, after in camera review, of statements of victim and forensic evidence indicating semen found was not that of defendant.

Cotton v. Commonwealth,
1996 WL 12683 (Va.App. Jan. 16, 1996)

Statutory burglary and arson convictions reversed where state failed to timely disclose its relationship with a key witness who was incarcerated with defendant prior to trial. In exchange for testimony, prosecutor had agreed to make efforts on the witness' behalf with the parole board, and witness had been furnished with a copy of defendant's statement to police, which he was seen reading prior to defendant's trial.

Shields v. State,
680 So.2d 969 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996)

Murder conviction reversed where state withheld evidence of victim's prior conviction for assault and other information tending to show victim was aggressive and prone to violent acts. This information was material to defendant's claim of self-defense.

Dinning v. State,
470 S.E.2d 431 (Ga. 1996)

New trial ordered on Giglio violation where prosecution failed to disclose evidence of immunity agreements with material prosecution witnesses where evidence against murder defendant was circumstantial and witnesses' testimony was critical to state's case; withheld evidence included videotape of one witness' interview with police which contained protracted discussion of immunity in exchange for testimony.

Smith v. State,
471 S.E.2d 227 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)

Conviction for selling crack cocaine reversed where special agent and probation officer had agreement that as part of informant's undercover work, officer would not serve outstanding warrant on informant and informant had crucial role in drug transaction, but state failed to fully disclose relationship with informant upon defendant's request and special agent testified that informant "didn't have any charges pending or anything."

Jiminez v. State,
918 P.2d 687 (Nev. 1996)

Postconviction relief granted in capital case where prosecution failed to disclose evidence of other possible suspects which was relevant to informant's impeachment and to challenge methods and reliability of police investigation, and failed to disclose evidence that informant had assisted police in other cases in exchange for dismissal of charges while police witness and informant both testified informant had no relationship with police in other cases; information could have altered outcome where evidence against defendant was circumstantial, informants' testimony that he overheard defendant's telephone conversation with his father in which he admitted to killing was impeachable, and police did only slight investigation of other possible suspects.

People v. Lantigua,
643 N.Y.S.2d 963 (N.Y.App.Div. 1996)

Sole eyewitness' recantation of identification testimony was not incredible or collateral to defendant's guilt or innocence in second-degree murder prosecution; credibility of eyewitness' testimony at trial, not of her recantation, was relevant issue, and there were questions as to conflicting testimony by eyewitness and her brother, and where eyewitness was at time of murder, and People's failure to disclose existence of another witness deprived defense of opportunity to investigate what that witness might have observed and of ability to conduct knowledgeable cross-examination of eyewitness as to her whereabouts, her view of events, distractions caused by presence of another person, and her general credibility.

People v. May,
644 N.Y.S.2d 525 (N.Y.App.Div. 1996)

Convictions for second degree murder, second degree attempted murder and first degree assualt reversed where prosecution failed to disclose arrangement with witness who was promised favorable sentence on unrelated charges in exchange for testimony against defendant, and failed to correct witness' false statement to effect that he had not been promised any consideration in return for testimony; nondisclosure was not harmless in light of significance of witness' testimony that he witnessed actions alleged in indictment.

Farmer v. State,
923 S.W.2d 876 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996)

New trial ordered where prosecution failed to disclose impeachment evidence that officer upon whose testimony state's case was built was not a police officer at time of trial because he had resigned shortly before after wrecking his police car and filing a false police report to cover up his violation of police rules; prosecutor admitted that decision had been made not to ask witness at trial where he was employed.

State v. Knight,
678 A.2d 642 (N.J. 1996)

Murder conviction reversed on cumulative impact of suppressed exculpatory evidence which included: state's alleged eyewitness got no prison time on unrelated offense carrying potential 364-day confinement period, despite prosecution's claim that she had no incentive to lie; woman eyewitness who claimed to have spoken to witness just prior to crime had made statement that she was not near crime site at critical time; and FBI agent had testified that he lacked certain information regarding case at time he interrogated defendant when teletype records showed he had received information.

Frierson v. State,
677 So.2d 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

Prosecution's failure to disclose police report and deposition of officer regarding incident strikingly similar to shooting incident for which defendant was convicted and which indicated that date of event was day after that indicated by witnesses required new trial; fact that witnesses who testified were alcohol and substance affected and could have mistaken date of incident, along with officer's description and other undisclosed discrepancies in eyewitness testimony, undermined confidence in jury's verdict.

State v. Womack,
679 A.2d 606 (N.J. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 517 (1996)

For purposes of defendant's prosecution for practicing medicine without a license, evidence that defendant told investigator his professional status as doctor of naturopathy and not medical doctor was not probative on state's theory regarding practice of medicine without a license, but was probative on state's alternative theory of holding oneself out as a medical doctor; failure to disclose such exculpatory evidence to grand jury required dismissal of portion of indictment asserting alternative theory.

Carroll v. State,
474 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)

Defendant who pleaded guilty to homicide by vehicle and serious injury by vehicle allowed to withdraw plea due to state's failure to disclose that sole state expert had indicated, shortly before defendant entered plea, that calculation of speed at which defendant was driving when she lost control of vehicle was incorrect and that it was not possible to calculate her speed based on data provided by investigating officer, and opined that road conditions contributed to accident.

Craig v. State,
685 So.2d 1224 (Fla. 1996)

Death sentence reversed and new sentencing hearing ordered where prosecutor elicited false and misleading testimony from codefendant indicating that he was serving two life sentences for his role in the crime and argued severity of codefendant's punishment to the jury when prosecutor knew that codefendant was already in a work release program and would soon be paroled; this information was material because it affected codefendant's credibility and prevented jury from considering actual disparity between sentences of each defendant.

State v. Ponce,
1996 WL 589267 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 10, 1996)

Rape conviction reversed where prosecution failed to turn over a police report and records from the county children's services authority. The police report contained a description of the alleged rape which was significantly inconsistent with the alleged victim's trial testimony, and the children's services records revealed information supportive of the defendant's theory at trial that the alleged victim's story had been fabricated. The court found that, "[c]ollectively, the prosecution's refusal to disclose the [materials] serve to undermine confidence in the outcome of defendant's trial." Id. at *6.

State v. Oliver,
682 So.2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1996)

New trial ordered where conviction hinged on credibility of two alleged victims who were key prosecution witnesses and prosecution failed to disclose statements made by each near time of offense differed significantly from their trial testimony.

State v. Cook,
940 S.W.2s 623 (Tex.Cr.App. 1996)

Defendant's conviction and death sentence for a 1977 murder reversed where testimony of a key prosecution witness from defendant's first trial was introduced against defendant at his third trial after the witness had died. The introduction of the testimony at the third trial undermined the reliability of defendant's conviction because the prosecution's earlier failure to disclose the witness' prior inconsistent statements to police and to the grand jury had precluded the defense from effectively investigating the witness' testimony and impeaching him with his prior statements.

Ex parte Mowbray,
943 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)

Murder conviction reversed where prosecution waited until two weeks before trial to disclose blood spatter expert's report tending to support defendant's contention that victim shot himself in bed next to her despite having received the report seven months earlier; prosecution purposely delayed disclosure and caused defense counsel to erroneously believe that the expert who had written the exculpatory report would be a witness for the state and be available for cross-examination.

Flores v. State,
940 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996)

Murder conviction reversed where prosecution failed to disclose written and verbal statements made by disinterested witness corroborating defendant's contention that victim, who was defendant's roommate, shot herself during an argument with defendant. Because there were no eyewitnesses to the shooting other than defendant her credibility was crucial, and undisclosed statements fully supported defendant's version of events such that, had they been disclosed, the result of the trial would likely have been different.

Ohio v. Aldridge,
1997 WL 111741 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. March 14, 1997) (unpublished)

Order granting relief from multiple convictions for forcible rape of a child and gross sexual imposition of a child affirmed where prosecution failed to disclose full length report detailing: numerous instances of highly suggestive questioning techniques employed with child accusers; medical evidence indicating absence of sexual abuse; inability of alleged child victim to identify picture of defendant; and numerous threats made by police investigator against child witnesses in the face of their denials that sexual abuse occurred. Rather than full report, defense counsel were furnished with a redacted version which made no mention of the exculpatory and impeaching information contained in the full length version.

People v. Ariosa,
660 N.Y.S.2d 255, 257 (N.Y.Co.Ct. 1997)

Indictment for three counts of forcible rape dismissed where prosecution waited until jury deliberations had begun to turn over an envelope it had possessed for several months containing numerous items directly contradicting the victim's assertions at trial, some of which were written in the victim's own hand. While the court expressed its belief that the prosecution's nondisclosure was not motivated by malice, it nevertheless decided to send a message to the state that its review of discoverable materials must be "a pro-active, vigorous attempt to respond to the requests made by defense counsel or to seek protective orders in circumstances they feel are inappropriate for discovery."

State v. Phillips,
940 S.W.2d 512 (Mo. 1997) (en banc)

New penalty phase ordered where state withheld audiotape containing hearsay statement indicating that defendant's son claimed sole responsibility for dismembering murder victim. The statement was material because the prosecution specifically argued that defendant deserved the death penalty because she had cut up the victim's body herself, and the sole aggravating circumstance found by the jury was depravity of mind, which was based upon the dismemberment of the victim's body.

State v. Kula,
562 N.W.2d 717 (Neb. 1997)

Murder conviction reversed and new trial ordered where prosecution failed to disclose material evidence regarding investigation of other suspects before the first day of trial and trial court abused its discretion and committed plain error by refusing to grant a continuance following disclosure of the evidence to allow counsel to investigate other suspects and prepare a defense.



Ware v. State,
702 A.2d 699 (Md. 1997)

Reversal required where prosecution failed to disclose that its key witnesses had a motion to reconsider sentence pending which was being held in abeyance until the conclusion of defendant's trial. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that this was an implied deal which should have been revealed.

People v. LaSalle,
663 N.Y.S. 2d 79 (1997)

First degree sodomy conviction reversed due to prosecution's failure to disclose that complaintant indicated at a prior hearing that she was unfamiliar with her attacker's full name.

State v. Blanco,
953 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997)

Trial court did not abuse discretion in granting a motion for a new trial due to state's failure to disclose in the prosecution of an aggravated assault case that the defendant's brother had confessed to the crime.

People v. Kasim,
66 Cal. Rptr.2d 494 (1997)

Reversal required where prosecution withheld impeachment evidence that key witnesses had received deals for lenient treatment in their own criminal cases in exchange for their testimony against defendant. Such evidence was material as the result of the trial depended in large part on the credibility of the witnesses.

State v. Missouri,
940 S.W.2d 512 (1997)

Death sentence reversed as a result of the state's failure to discose a statement indicating that it was defendant's son rather than defendant who dismembered the victim's body. Such evidence, had it been known to the jury, reasonable could have affected the sentence that rested on the aggravating circumstance of depravity of mind.

People v. Johnson,
666 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1997)

In prosecution for sale of a controlled substance, prosecution erred in not disclosing lab analysis that contained alterations testified to by a police officer. New trial ordered.

State v. Harris,
713 N.E.2d 528 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of felony possession of marijuana charges against defendants following disclosure by a prosecution investigator during trial that he had long possessed an airport log indicating that defendants had not been given baggage claim tickets when they boarded the flight on which the prosecution contended the defendants were smuggling marijuana. This evidence was consistent with defendants', which was that a third party who purchased defendants' tickets and encouraged them to fly to Ohio to look for work had actually placed the marijuana in their luggage without their knowledge. The court of appeals found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charges rather than imposing a lesser sanction in light of the fact that the information had been purposely withheld, and continuing the case would result in undue prejudice to the defendants.

People v. Diaz,
696 N.E.2d 819, 826-828 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998)

Defendant, a county jail correctional officer, was convicted of three charges arising out of his alleged involvement in drug dealing within the jail. The court reversed the convictions on the ground that the prosecution violated Brady and Napue by failing to disclose that an important inmate witness had been given a deal resulting in an illegal concurrent sentence, and by failing to correct that witness' false testimony that he had not received favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony. Rejecting the state's contention that the witness had not been given a deal, the court noted a clear indication in the State's Attorney's undisclosed file that the witness' "illegal sentence was 'OK'd' by a supervisor in the State's Attorney's office because [the witness] had worked as an informant for the State's Attorney's public integrity unit," and explained that "this court does not have to ignore common sense." "An agreement between the State and its witness," the court continued, "does not have to be so specific that it satisfies the traditional requirements for an enforceable contract." Here, the "circumstances, taken as a whole, indicate that a deal was made between [the witness] and the State . . .." Turning to the prosecution's failure to correct the witness' false denial that a deal existed, the court stated: "We consider the State's conduct to have been outrageous and we will not tolerate it. . . . That [conduct] raises questions about the State's integrity and goes to the heart of the judicial system--confidence in the factfinding process."

Little v. State,
971 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tx. Ct. App. 1998)

Defendant's DWI conviction was reversed due to the prosecution's failure to reveal to defense counsel that its expert on blood alcohol content had lost the graphical information necessary to assess the accuracy of the state's blood alcohol analysis. Although this information was not directly exculpatory, it was impeaching in the sense that "the graphical results are necessary to analyze the reliability . . . of the results of the blood test." In concluding that relief was warranted under Brady, the court reasoned: "[H]ad the State disclosed the loss of the evidence as soon as it became aware of the fact, defense counsel would have had the option of employing a different trial strategy--one that may have resulted in exclusion of the testimony altogether. * * * The testimony was the only quantitative evidence of appellant's intoxication. * * * Thus, we conclude the State's failure to inform the defense of the lost evidence is a failure to disclose material information which undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."

State ex rel. Yeager v. Trent
510 S.E.2d 790 (W.Va. 1998)

Petitioner was entitled to a new trial on murder charge where substantial evidence developed post-trial indicated that a critical prosecution witness had an undisclosed plea agreement.

State v. Nelson,
715 A.2d 281, 285-288 (N.J. 1998)

Defendant's death sentence was vacated on the ground that the prosecution violated Brady by failing to reveal that an officer wounded during defendant's shootout with police had served notice of, and later filed, a lawsuit against local authorities alleging that they had failed to provide training and instruction necessary to ensure the safety of police officers in situations such as the one that occurred in this case. The court reasoned as follows concerning the materiality of the officer's allegations to the sentencing phase of defendant's trial: "Had the jury been aware that this crucial witness, the brother of one of the dead police officers, agreed with defendant that inadequate police training had sparked defendant's violent reaction, it is at least reasonably probable that an additional juror or jurors would have found the existence of one or more of defendant's mitigating factors."

State v. Calloway,
718 So.2d 559, 563 (La. Ct. App. 1998)

Defendant's convictions for two counts of first-degree murder were reversed due to nondisclosure by the prosecution and the trial court (which reviewed the information in camera) of statements made by two of the prosecution's primary eyewitnesses. These statements, which were taken shortly after the murders occurred, contradicted the eyewitnesses' trial testimony in several important respects, including the height, weight, age and attire of the assailant. The court explained that the failure to make these statements available to the defense "not only . . . deprived [defense counsel] of the opportunity to cross examine the witnesses about these inconsistencies, but . . . also deprived [defendant] of the opportunity to show the weakness in the [witnesses'] identifications. Further, it might have bolstered the defense theory that the witnesses colluded to cover up what really happened on the night in question."

State v. Parker,
721 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 1998)

The court granted sentencing phase relief in this Florida capital case as a result of the state's suppression of evidence from a jailhouse informant indicating that a co-defendant, not petitioner, actually shot and killed the victim. In concluding that this evidence was material, the court noted that petitioner had been sentenced to death by a vote of eight to four, and that the only evidence suggesting petitioner had been the shooter was the testimony of another co-defendant's girlfriend, who claimed petitioner admitted the shooting while the girlfriend was visiting his co-defendant in jail. That co-defendant received a life sentence.

State v. Copeland,
949 P.2d 458 (1998)

Conviction of second-degree rape reversed where prosecution failed to disclose that the victim/witness had a prior felony conviction. Such information could have been used by the defense to impeach this key witness, and there is a substantial liklihood that the failure to disclose the prior record affected the jury's verdict.

In re Brown,
952 P.2d 715 (Cal. 1998)

Writ of habeas corpus granted in capital case where crime lab neglected to provide the defense a copy of the worksheet attached to defendant's toxicology report, even though the prosecution was unaware of the error. The prosecution was obligated to review the lab files for exculpatory evidence and provide any such evidence to the defense. The worksheet reflected that PCP was present in the defendant's system at the time of the incident, which would have supported his claim of diminished capacity.

State v. Allen,
1999 WL 5173 at *4-5. (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan 8, 1999)

Defendants' attempted rape convictions were reversed on the ground that the state breached its Brady obligation by failing to comply with a court order to review the alleged rape victim's psychiatric treatment records for exculpatory information. Citing concerns for the alleged victim's privacy, the prosecutor never undertook the order examination, and therefore failed to uncover and disclose evidence indicating that the alleged victim had a documented history of, among other things, psychotic behavior. Because the outcome of defendants' trial "primarily turned on the credibility of the victim," the appellate court concluded that they were entitled to relief. Commenting on the prosecutorial inaction which led to the Brady violation in this case, the court stated that "[a] 'hear no evil, see no evil' attitude is inconsistent with prosecutorial responsibilities."

Rowe v. State,
704 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)

The court granted post-conviction relief from petitioner's convictions for murder and attempted murder. At trial, petitioner's "intoxication and insanity defenses were completely hamstrung by" the testimony of his roommate/lover that petitioner had not ingested any drugs prior to shooting several members of his own family. The state violated Brady, however, by failing to reveal that this witness had been convicted of burglary and theft and was on probation at the time of his testimony. This information would have been useful to petitioner in order to establish that the witness had strong motivation to deny taking part with petitioner in the consumption of illegal drugs -- namely, admitting taking drugs would have strengthened the state's case at the witness' probation revocation proceeding scheduled to take place a few months after petitioner's trial.

Gibson v. State,
514 S.E.2d 320, 325-326 (S.C. 1999)

The court affirmed the grant of state post-conviction from petitioner's guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter on the ground that the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose that a state witness could not have seen the crime in the manner she claimed because the view from the position she described was obstructed. When confronted with this fact by state authorities with whom she visited the crime scene, the witness changed her story. If disclosed, this evidence would have been favorable to petitioner as additional proof of the witness' propensity to lie. The evidence was material because, had it been disclosed, there was a reasonable probability that petitioner would have chosen to go to trial instead of pleading guilty.

In re Pratt,
82 Cal.Rptr.2d 260, 270-271 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)

The court affirmed the trial court's grant of state habeas relief on the ground that the state violated Brady by failing to disclose a substantial amount of evidence indicating that the only prosecution witness to claim that petitioner had confessed to the murder for which he was convicted had been a long-time informant for state and federal law enforcement agents, and had received favorable treatment in return for his cooperation with authorities. In the course of its decision, the appellate court provided a useful discussion of how Brady claims should be analyzed on state habeas in California.

State v. DelReal,
593 N.W.2d 461 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)

Defendant's conviction for second degree recklessly endangering safety while armed was reversed due to the prosecution's failure to reveal that his hands had been swabbed for gunshot residue, but that the swabs were not analyzed prior to trial. This evidence was material both because the results of the post-trial tests requested by defendant were negative, and because the fact that the swabs had been taken directly contradicted the testimony of the self-proclaimed lead investigator, who testified unequivocally that no swabs had been taken. In the context of this case, which involved questionable eyewitness identifications of defendant and inconsistent testimony as to the location of the perpetrator relative to others at the scene, there was a reasonable probability of a different result had the residue evidence been revealed.

Little v. State,
736 So.2d 486 (Miss. App. 1999)

The court reversed defendant's embezzlement conviction on the ground that the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose the existence and contents of a "cash receipts journal" which documented that "the bulk" of the $96,000 he was accused of embezzling had in fact been deposited into the company account.

People v. Torres,
712 N.E.2d 835 (Ill. App. 1999)

The court reversed petitioner's convictions for murder and two counts of attempted murder where the prosecution failed to disclose that two of its witnesses were promised release from probation in exchange for their testimony, and failed to correct one witness' false testimony that he had not been promised leniency in exchange for his testimony. This evidence was material because, aside from these witnesses, only two others identified petitioner as a shooter, and all of the prosecution's witnesses were members of a gang that was at odds with petitioner's gang.

Young v. State,
739 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1999)

The Florida Supreme Court vacated petitioner's death sentence and remanded for resentencing due to the prosecution's failure to disclose attorney notes indicating that one of its key witnesses who testified to the sequence and type of gunshots he claimed to have heard during petitioner's altercation with the decedent had initially indicated that he was not even sure whether he had heard gunshots or firecrackers. In addition, the prosecution withheld statements from other people which, if disclosed, would have provided corroboration for petitioner's theory that the decedent had fired first and petitioner returned fire in self defense. In the course of granting relief, the court rejected the state's contention that the exculpatory notes were attorney work product and therefore exempt from disclosure. The court explained that "the [disclosure] obligation exists even if such a document is work product or exempt from the public records law."

Johnson v. State,
1999 WL 608861 (Tenn.Crim.App. Aug. 12, 1999), aff'd, 38 S.W.3d 52 (Tenn. 2001)

The state violated in connection with the sentencing phase of petitioner's capital trial by withholding a crime scene report indicating that a bullet which grazed a bystander could not have been fired from the location the state contended petitioner was in at the time of the offense. This evidence was material because the state argued to the jury that petitioner had fired that shot in support of the aggravating circumstance of creating a great risk of death to others, which the jury ultimately found.

State v. Castor,
599 N.W.2d 201 (Neb. 1999)

The state's failure, despite a Brady request by the defense, to disclose statements of two witnesses, one of which directly contradicted the state's theory that the victim was shot in his home, and one of which supported defendant's theory that the victim disappeared after getting into a brown pickup truck parked in front of the victim's house, violated Brady, and warranted grant of defendant's motion for new trial.

Mooney v. State,
990 P.2d 875 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999)

Although not expressly relying on Brady, the appeals court vacates the death sentence due to the prosecutor’s failure to timely disclose letters from the State’s star witness on the continuing threat aggravator, where investigation into the contents of the letters would have provided substantial evidence to effectively confront and impeach the witness concerning his motive for testifying. He claimed in one letter, and while testifying, that his reason for coming forward was because his grandfather had been murdered under circumstances similar to the capital offense. In fact, his grandfather had not been killed and his true motive for testifying was to obtain relocation within the prison system.

Robles v. State,
1999 WL 812295 (Tex.App. Oct. 7, 1999)

The court reversed defendant's convictions for sexual assault and indecency with a child on the ground that the prosecution acted in bad faith in misleading the trial court as to the existence of a tape recording of the alleged victim, who recanted at trial, being interviewed, and possibly coerced and threatened, by the prosecutor and a child protective services worker. Assuming that the tape no longer exists, the court remanded for a development of evidence of the tape's contents to be followed by a determination whether, in light of the tape's destruction, defendant can be afforded a fair trial.

State v. Sturgeon,
605 N.W.2d 589 (Wis.App. 1999)

Defendant established his right to withdraw a guilty plea to burglary due to the state's failure to disclose an interview transcript and an officer's personal recollection indicating that he twice denied any knowing involvement in the crime; the evidence was within the exclusive control of the prosecution, and defendant established that the Brady violation caused him to plead guilty.

Mazzan v. Warden,
993 P.2d 25 (Nev. 2000)

The court granted relief in this 1979 capital murder case, finding the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose numerous documents indicating that an alternate suspect with a motive had been in the area with an associate on the night of the murder. Had this information been disclosed, it would have supported petitioner's claim that he heard two people running from the murder scene. The withheld information revealed suspicion among law enforcement that the decedent had been killed as a result of his involvement in a major drug dealing organization, and the alternate suspect was believed by law enforcement to have been a key figure in that organization.

Harridge v. State,
534 S.E.2d 113 (Ga.App. 2000)

In this vehicular homicide case, the state violated Brady by failing to reveal the existence of lab results generated by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation indicating that cocaine and marijuana had been detected in the decedent's urine. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that, "[f]or purposes of Brady, we decide whether someone is on the prosecution team on a case-by-case basis by reviewing the interaction, cooperation and dependence of the agents working on the case. . . . Here, the GBI laboratory was fully involved in the investigation of this case in that it was responsible for testing not only [the decedent's] blood and urine, but also [defendant's] blood. Moreover, both the medical examiner and the prosecutor were completely dependent on the crime lab for determining the amount of drugs and alcohol present in [the decedent's and defendant's] bodies. Because the GBI laboratory was part of the prosecution team and based on [the GBI doctor's] affidavit, we find that the state had possession of the test results showing drugs in Smith's urine."

State v. Nelson,
749 A.2d 380 (N.J.App.Div. 2000)

The state's failure to reveal that one of its witnesses in this drug case had a prior sexual assault conviction violated Brady; the witness was important to the state's case, the trial involved a credibility contest, the defendant was impeached with his own prior conviction, and the jury deliberated for over two days, reaching a verdict only after hearing a read-back of witness' testimony.

State v. Larimore,
17 S.W.3d 87 (Ark. 2000)

The state's suppression of evidence of a state medical examiner's change of opinion concerning time of death following his conversation with police about his initial time of death determination providing defendant with an "iron-clad alibi" violated Brady.

State v. Henderson,
2000 WL 731472 (Ohio App. 1 Dist. June 9, 2000)

The state violated Brady defendant's felonious assault prosecution arising out of a drive by shooting by failing to disclose the taped statement of another individual who claimed to have been driving the car in which defendant was riding. This statement was significant because it contradicted the prosecution's two witnesses, both of whom testified that defendant was both the driver and the shooter.

Buck v. State,
70 S.W.3d 440 (Mo.App.E.D. 2000)

The state's failure to inform defendant about five of a prosecution witness' six convictions prejudiced defendant at his trial for tampering with a witness; although the prosecutor told defendant about one of the convictions, the witness was central to the prosecution's case in that he provided the only evidence that defendant tampered with a witness, and the other convictions would have been useful for impeachment.

State v. Hunt,
615 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 2000)

The prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose that a psychological examination of its key witness against defendant revealed that the witness was incompetent to stand trial.

People v. Ellis,
735 N.E.2d 736 (Ill.App. 2000)

The appellate court reversed the denial of post-conviction relief in this murder case, finding that the prosecutor violated Brady by failing to inform defense counsel and the jury about benefits, of which prosecutor knew or should have known, which were orally promised to prosecution witnesses in exchange for their testimony. In so holding, the court imputed a detective's knowledge of these promises to the prosecutor.

State v. Harris,
2000 WL 1376459 (Ohio App. Sept. 26, 2000)

The Ohio court of appeals reversed defendant's attempted murder and felonious assault convictions due to the prosecution's suppression of the victim's grand jury testimony, in which the victim denied having a gun prior to the fight which led to his stabbing. At trial, the victim acknowledged having had a gun prior to the fight. Although the version provided by the victim at trial was more favorable to defendant than the version he gave to the grand jury, the court of appeals concluded that the suppression of the grand jury testimony prejudiced defendant by depriving him of information which would have been useful for impeaching the victim's trial testimony. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that "the prosecution placed emphasis on the veracity of [victim]'s account of losing possession of the handgun [before being stabbed] . . . [and] challenged the jurors to contrast [victim]'s testimony against the testimony of 'defendant and his friends who have already lied to both the police and on the stand.'"

Byrd v. Owen,
536 S.E.2d 736 (Ga. 2000)

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the grant of habeas relief in this drug-related murder case on the ground that the state deprived petitioner of due process by withholding evidence that it had reached an immunity agreement with its key witness, and by failing to correct the witness' misleading testimony about the existence of such an agreement. The court further found that the state's nondisclosure deprived petitioner of his right to effective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. Counsel testified in habeas proceedings that he would not have advised petitioner to waive trial by jury if he had known of the state's deal with the witness; with regard to direct appeal, the state's suppression of evidence of its agreement with the witness deprived counsel of the ability to raise all meritorious issues. The state's misconduct in this case was made more egregious by the fact that petitioner's direct appeal focused on the suppression of information about deals with two other witnesses, which the appellate court held should have been turned over pursuant to Brady before concluding that petitioner had not demonstrated materiality.

Commonwealth v. Strong,
761 A.2d 1167 (Penn. 2000)

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the denial of post-conviction relief in this capital case, finding that the state violated Brady by failing to reveal the existence of an understanding between the state and petitioner's co-perpetrator, pursuant to which the co-perpetrator was offered a sentence of two years on charges of murder and kidnapping in exchange for his testimony, and eventually received a sentence of 40 months after pleading guilty. The court found it irrelevant that the trial prosecutor had been unaware that his superior had been negotiating the co-perpetrator's deal with his counsel, and found the evidence of that deal "material" because there were obvious discrepancies between petitioner's and the co-perpetrator's testimony, and because the co-perpetrator was the key witness who put the gun in petitioner's hand at the time of the murder.

Commonwealth v. Hill,
739 N.E.2d 670 (Mass. 2000)

The court affirmed the grant of a new trial in this Massachusetts murder case, concluding that the state violated Brady by deliberately failing to disclose a leniency agreement with a key prosecution witness, despite requests for such information. The state's nondisclosure deprived defendant of his right to cross-examine the witness effectively, and the harm resulting from this nondisclosure was exacerbated by the conduct of the prosecutor, who allowed the witness to mislead the jury about his own sentencing expectations and his motive for testifying for the state, and suggested in closing argument that the jury should assess credibility by considering whether the witness had "something to lose," and that defendant was the only witness with anything to lose.

Lay v. State,
14 P.3d 1256 (Nev. 2000)

The court granted post-conviction relief from petitioner's murder conviction after concluding that the state violated Brady by withholding evidence that a paramedic, who testified that the victim identified petitioner as the shooter, had stated in several pretrial interviews that the victim did not tell her anything while she was treating him. This information was favorable and material because, apart from evidence of petitioner's fingerprints on the stolen car from which shots were fired, the paramedic was the only neutral witness to provide evidence that petitioner either fired shots or drove the car.

Johnson v. State,
38 S.W.3d 52 (Tenn. 2001)

In this Tennessee capital case, the court granted sentencing phase post-conviction relief on the ground that the state violated Brady by withholding a police report containing favorable information material to the issue of the applicability of an aggravating sentencing factor. The withheld police report showed that petitioner could not have fired the bullet that grazed a customer during a grocery store robbery. The state relied on the theory that petitioner fired that bullet to support the aggravating circumstance that he knowingly created great risk of death to two or more persons, other than the murder victim, during the act of murder. The court found the information in the police report material because, had it been disclosed, there was a reasonable probability that the aggravating circumstance would not have been applied to petitioner; absent evidence that petitioner fired the bullet in question, the state failed to prove that he placed any other people at great risk of death.

State v. McKinnon,
2001 WL 69214 (Ohio.App. Jan. 29, 2001)

Defendant's rape conviction was reversed due to the prosecution's nondisclosure of an investigative report quoting a security guard from the apartment complex where the alleged victim claimed to have been raped as having been told by the alleged victim that her attacker made her take off all her clothes and do it on the floor. At trial, on the other hand, the alleged victim testified that her attacker "tore off" her clothes. The court found the undisclosed report favorable and material because it could have been used to undermine the alleged victim's credibility, and rebut the prosecution's argument that she had been consistent in her account of the attack every time she spoke about it - both crucial points given that the alleged victim's testimony was the only evidence tying defendant to the attack.

Rogers v. State,
782 So.2d 373 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam)

The court granted post-conviction relief in this Florida capital case, finding that the state violated Brady by failing to disclose: (1) a second confession by defendant's alleged co-perpetrator, who also testified for the prosecution, which could have been used to show that although defendant participated in other robberies with co-perpetrator, he had not participated in the one for which he was being tried; and (2) an audiotape of a witness preparation session on which the prosecution can be heard attempting to influence the testimony of its chief witness.

Wilson v. State,
768 A.2d675 (Md.Ct.App. 2001)

The court upheld the grant of post-conviction relief in this case involving robbery and related charges on the ground that the state violated Brady by failing to disclose written plea agreements between the state and two key codefendant witnesses. Although defense counsel was able to elicit some information about the witnesses' deals during their testimony, that testimony was not completely accurate, and the inaccuracy was compounded by the state's characterization of those deals, and of the witnesses' lack of motivation to lie, during closing arguments.

Garrett v. State,
2001 WL 280145 (Tenn.Crim.App. March 22, 2001)

The prosecution violated Brady in this arson / felony murder case by failing to disclose an investigative report containing a statement by the first fireman to reach the victim, who was found in a utility room in a burning house. At trial, the state contended that the utility room door had been locked from the outside, raising the implication that the defendant locked the victim in the room prior to setting the house on fire. The report, however, indicated that the first person to reach the utility room found the door unlocked. The court found this information favorable and material even though the state presented additional evidence in post-conviction proceedings suggesting that the person who made the report had misquoted the fireman, who had actually stated that the door was locked at the time he arrived.

State v. Gonzalez,
624 N.W.2d 836 (S.D. 2001)

The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed defendant's conviction of attempted statutory rape, finding that the state failed to disclose - in direct violation of the trial court's order - the alleged victim's counseling records. Those records were favorable and material because they contained a version of the alleged sexual encounters that differed from that offered by the complainant - who was the state's only witness on this issue - with respect to the number of encounters, and the events which took place during those encounters.

Spray v. State,
2001 WL 522004 (Tex.App. May 17, 2001)

The court reversed the defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen, finding that the state violated Brady by failing to disclose a Child Protective Services report reflecting that the alleged victim's sister, who corroborated the abuse allegations at trial, had denied any sexual abuse when questioned by investigators. On appeal, the court concluded that "[c]learly the CPS report was favorable and material in that [alleged victim's sister], the only other witness who can corroborate the sexual assault allegations, made statements contained therein that directly contradict her testimony at trial."

State v. Huggins,
788 So.2d 238 (Fla. 2001)

The state violated Brady in this Florida capital case by failing to disclose the statement of a witness indicating that he saw the defendant's wife driving a vehicle similar to the victim's vehicle. The substance of this statement contradicted the testimony of the defendant's wife, who was a key prosecution witness. The court found that the state suppressed the information even though it had provided the defense with a "lead sheet" naming the witness, because that sheet inaccurately reflected that the witness had seen a male driving the victim's vehicle, thereby making the witness' account seem unfavorable to the defense.

Hoffman v. State,
800 So.2d 174 (Fla. 2001)

The court reversed the denial of post-conviction relief in this Florida capital case, and remanded for the grant of a new trial. The state violated Brady by failing to disclose the results of analysis performed on strands of hair found in one victim's hands; those results excluded defendant, his co-defendant, and both victims as possible sources of the hairs, prejudiced the defense and entitled defendant to new trial, where only other evidence linking defendant to murders was a single fingerprint found on pack of cigarettes in victims' motel room, and defendant's confessions, and where another suspect had also confessed; defendant challenged both of his confessions at trial, and saliva samples taken from cigarette butts found at murder scene did not match defendant's blood type.

State v. Kemp,
828 So.2d 540 (La. 2002)

Second degree murder conviction reversed where the prosecution failed to timely reveal a taped statement of an eyewitness which mentioned a comment by the victim that lent support to petitioner’s self defense contention. Although the statement came out towards the end of the trial, reversal was still required. "[T]he details provided by [the witness] in her taped statement which had [the victim] offering an option to ‘shoot it out’ possess such potential to give the evidence at trial an entirely different cast that undermines confidence in this jury's rejection of [Kemp’s] self- defense claim. To this extent, the state's failure to provide timely disclosure impacted the fundamental fairness of the proceedings leading to [Kemp’s] conviction."

Atkinson v. State,
778 A.2d 1058 (Del. 2001)

Defendant's conviction of attempted unlawful sexual intercourse second degree and related charges was reversed due to the state's failure to disclose notes of witness interviews done by an investigating prosecutor until that prosecutor testified as the state's final witness. The notes revealed that the complainant, who was the state's main witness, had not initially described the sexual component of the alleged assault to three of the state's witnesses; if the notes had been made available to defense counsel before trial, cross-examination of those witnesses may have changed outcome of defendant's trial.

State v. Barber
554 S.E.2d 413 (N.C. 2001)

Due process violation found where prosecution failed to disclose telephone records that were not merely corroborative, but rather lent crucial factual support to a defense witness whose credibility was questioned by the prosecution. Evidence proffered by the petitioner to establish materiality included affidavits from two jurors confirming that, had the phone records been introduced at trial, it "would have" and "could have" affected the verdict.

Hoffman v. State
800 So.2d 174 (Fla. 2001)

Where the state failed to disclose results of scientific hair analysis which excluded petitioner, codefendant and male victim as the sources of hairs found in the female victim’s hands, petitioner was prejudiced. In addition, under circumstances where another person also confessed to the crime, the state’s failure to disclose information regarding the existence of other suspects prejudiced petitioner.

Martin v. State
839 So.2d 665 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001)

Postconviction relief granted to Alabama death row inmate in light of prosecution’s suppression of several pieces of material evidence. The undisclosed evidence included: (1) the fact that the sole eyewitness to defendant’s presence near the crime scene had undergone hypnosis; (2) a statement made by the sole eyewitness while under hypnosis; (3) a description of the perpetrator (which did not match defendant) and an identification of someone other than defendant at a pretrial lineup by a witness who testified at trial she was unable to identify the perpetrator because she had been focused on the gun; (4) the presence of unidentified fingerprints on evidence related to the murder; and (5) a suggestive photo array regarding defendant’s car.

Hensley v. State
48 P.3d 1099 (Wy. 2002)

Where the state suppressed evidence which could have been used to impeach a confidential informant, the Court held that such evidence was material and warranted a reversal of the defendant’s conviction. The evidence at issue was an audio recording of the informant allegedly using methamphetamine, which was inconsistent with her testimony that she was addressing her addiction and only used methamphetamine once during the two years that she worked for the government.

Conyers v. State
790 A.2d 15 (Md. 2002)

Postconviction relief granted regarding capital conviction and death sentence where the State suppressed evidence that the jailhouse snitch requested a benefit when he first approached the police and that he refused to sign his written statement absent such a commitment. That the jury was aware that the informant later received a plea agreement in return for his testimony against defendant did not vitiate the State’s error in withholding the other evidence. The suppressed evidence is found to be material for a number of reasons, including: (1) the snitch was a key witness as to defendant’s principalship in the murder and principalship directly governed eligibility for the death penalty; and (2) the prosecution emphasized the snitch’s credibility in argument.

Nickerson v. State
69 S.W.3d 661 (Tex.App. - Waco 2002)

Murder conviction is reversed due to prosecution’s untimely disclosure of a videotape showing defendant’s bizarre behavior in jail prior to trial. ( The tape was revealed for the first time during the punishment phase of the proceedings.) It was clearly favorable to an insanity defense, which defendant had considered raising, and it was undisputed that the tape was in the possession of agents acting on behalf of the State. In light of the uncertainty regarding defendant’s sanity, his personal "knowledge" of the taped event had no bearing on what his attorney should have known. The tape was deemed "material" given that two mental health experts expressed strong reservations about their initial sanity diagnoses after their review of the videotape, and despite the fact that two experts presented by the prosecution did not believe that the tape established defendant’s insanity at the time of the crime.


Ex parte Richardson
70 S.W.3d 865 (Tex. Crim.App. 2002)

Capital conviction and death sentence reversed based on prosecution’s suppression of a diary kept by one of the police officers who was guarding the State’s sole eyewitness to the crime. The diary revealed the officer’s belief that the witness was not a truthful person, and also identified five other members of the protective team who harbored the same opinion. In finding the suppressed evidence material, the appeals court notes that the eyewitness’s credibility was the key issue, and when her credibility was successfully challenged at the separate trials of the two co-defendants, both were acquitted. Although petitioner did challenge the witness’s credibility at the time of his own trial, "nothing that [petitioner’s] attorney presented . . . could compare with a parade of six law enforcement officers testifying that, in their opinion, [the purported eyewitness] was not a credible witness and not worthy of belief under oath."

Ramirez v. State
96 S.W.3d 386 (Tex.App. - Austin 2002)

In "official oppression" prosecution, State’s knowing use of false and misleading testimony by key witness against defendant entitled him to a new trial. The State violated the Mooney-Pyle-Napue line of cases by permitting the witness to testify that her contact with an attorney was not about seeking money, even though the prosecution was aware that a civil suit had been or soon would be filed by that attorney against the city. That the witness did not know that the lawsuit had actually been filed at the time she testified was irrelevant since the State knew that the testimony was false or misleading.

People v. Martinez
103 Cal.App.4th 1071 (Cal.App. 2002)

Habeas relief granted where prosecution failed to investigate and confirm allegations that critical prosecution witness had prior felony convictions that had been expunged and also failed to reveal that charges were pending against the witness at the time of trial.

Harrington v. State
659 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 2003)

Approximately twenty-five years after his murder conviction, petitioner was granted postconviction relief based on the suppression of police reports that provided "abundant material for defense counsel to argue that [a third party] had the opportunity and motive to commit the crime." Although trial counsel had some information about a suspicious third party, he was denied "the ‘essential facts’ of the police reports so as to allow the defense to wholly take advantage of this evidence." In order to show materiality petitioner was not required to establish that the police reports would have "led to evidence that someone else committed [the] crime." If the evidence would create a reasonable doubt about the petitioner’s guilt, "it is material even if it would not convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that [the third party] was the killer."

Hutchison v. State
118 S.W.3d 720 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003)

In burglary and assault case, the trial court did not err in considering a claim of Brady error that was raised after the statute of limitations had run in light of its finding that petitioner Harper had raised the claim within one year of learning about the existence of an exculpatory FBI report indicating that petitioner Hutchinson’s tools had not been used in the burglary. The trial court also properly permitted the petitioners to amend their petitions, despite a limited remand from the appellate court, given the discovery of additional exculpatory evidence. Evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the state, acting in good faith, unintentionally failed to disclose exculpatory material, i.e., the FBI report and a statement by a witness which would have lent some support to the defense theory that the assault was committed by the victim’s cousin and was unrelated to any burglary. The grant of post-conviction relief on the claim of Brady violations is affirmed.

State v. Lindsey
844 So.2d 961 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2003)

In homicide case where the defense at trial centered on petitioner’s intoxication, the prosecution violated Brady by failing to reveal that two witnesses who testified to petitioner’s sobriety at trial had previously stated that he was intoxicated at the time of the shooting. Although petitioner’s trial counsel could not be found, and so there was no definitive proof that the prior statements had not been disclosed to him, the appellate court rejected the trial court’s conclusion that petitioner had failed to meet his burden of establishing suppression. The trial prosecutor, who had not been on the case throughout the proceedings, testified that she would have turned over the statements had she been aware of them. Given that defense counsel presented an intoxication defense but did not impeach the witnesses with the prior statements, the prosecutor presumed that defense counsel did not receive the statements. Further, the prosecution’s file indicated that the State's answer to discovery was that the defense was not entitled to the witnesses’ statements. Finally, the suppressed statements were material under Brady, contrary to the finding of the trial court.

Keeter v. State
105 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. App. - Waco 2003)

In case involving charges that defendant sexual abused his stepdaughter, his claim of Brady error was properly preserved through his amended motion for new trial which was accompanied by an affidavit from the victim’s stepmother stating that the victim had changed her story so many times that she was not believed by the stepmother, and that the prosecutor told the stepmother that she would not be called as a witness in light of her disbelief of the victim. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for new trial, it is found that the prosecution suppressed favorable evidence that neither the victim’s father nor her stepmother believed the victim, that they thought she was a constant liar, and that the victim had made contradictory statements to them about defendant. This evidence was material given that the case against defendant rested on the testimony of the victim, and the suppressed evidence could have raised doubts about the victim’s credibility. The court squarely rejects the argument that the evidence did not have to be disclosed because it could have been discovered by defense counsel acting with due diligence. "The cases do not hold that the prosecution is relieved of its duty under Brady to disclose exculpatory evidence when defense counsel (a) knows or should know a witness exists, and (b) might discover the exculpatory evidence if defense counsel asks the right questions of the witness. Implementation of such a rule could effectively undermine Brady because it would almost always relieve the prosecutor of disclosing Brady information."

State v. VanWinkle
2003 WL 1798945 (Neb.App. April 8, 2003)(unpublished)

In case involving charges of burglary and criminal mischief, the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland when it suppressed a letter written by its key prosecution witness – who was the alleged accomplice– which stated that defendant was innocent of the crimes. The fact that the information was not sought by Van Winkle through a discovery request was irrelevant. And the letter was not cumulative to other evidence which also impeached the alleged accomplice. "The fact [the alleged accomplice] was impeached to a degree by evidence that he had lied when he accused VanWinkle of another similar crime in Palmer, that he was an unwilling witness testifying under the threat of prosecution for additional crimes, and that he had told [another person] that VanWinkle was not there is not the same as a written statement to the prosecutor that [the alleged accomplice] was lying when he accused VanWinkle of the crime."

People v. Kazakevicius
2003 WL 21190612 (Mich.App. May 20, 2003)(unpublished)

In case involving charges of criminal sexual conduct, a Brady violation occurred when the prosecution effectively suppressed the alleged victim’s counseling records that "could be read to indicate that the victim had suppressed her memories of the alleged sexual abuse for several years; that it was through counseling that these memories resurfaced; that the victim still did not have a complete memory of what allegedly happened; and that the victim's memories may have been triggered by a form of hypnosis during counseling." (The records were in the possession of the prosecution and the trial court denied defendant’s request for in camera review of the records.) The counseling records were material given that the victim's testimony was the principal evidence against defendant, and the counseling records "would have allowed defendant to explore possible alternative explanations for the origin of the allegations of sexual abuse, including whether they were the product of outside influences affecting both the reliability of the allegations and the credibility of the victim."

Brownlow v. Schofield
587 S.E.2d 647 (Ga. 2003)

Prosecutor violated Brady in child molestation case by failing to reveal that during an interview 10 days before trial the alleged victim shook his head negatively when asked by the prosecutor whether the defendant had committed oral sodomy on him. The trial court erred in denying relief on the ground that the prosecution had disclosed to the defense similar and more weighty exculpatory evidence, i.e., a videotape of an earlier interview with the alleged victim in which he denied that any improper touching occurred. Given that the only evidence of defendant’s guilt was the alleged victim’s trial testimony claiming oral sodomy had occurred, there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable verdict on that count had the prosecutor disclosed the second denial.

State v. Greco
862 So.2d 1152 (La. App. 2003)

In non-capital robbery-murder case where the defendant had claimed self-defense, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the defendant was entitled to relief based upon the recantations of two prosecution witnesses and their claims that law enforcement officers and the prosecutor’s investigator suborned perjury. The witnesses testified in post-conviction proceedings that the prosecution’s key witness was the one who stated he planned to "roll" the victim, and that they had falsely attributed the remark to defendant at trial because of threats by authorities. The credibility of trial testimony by the officers regarding the circumstances of taking defendant's confession, in which a detective admitted paraphrasing certain statements and omitting others, was sufficiently undermined and called into doubt the validity of other statements and the confession, thus entitling defendant to a new trial.

State v. Bennett
81 P.3d 1 (Nev. 2003)

The prosecution committed a Brady violation where it failed to disclose a statement by a jailhouse informant that the co-defendant had admitted that he planned the murder of the victims during the robbery and had convinced petitioner to do the killing. Although the statement was obtained after the jury returned a death verdict against petitioner, it was before formal sentencing and its revelation to petitioner when it was obtained would have entitled petitioner to a new penalty hearing. The statement was favorable at the sentencing stage in that: (1) it was relevant to refute the aggravating circumstance that the murder was random and without apparent motive; and (2) it provided mitigating evidence by characterizing petitioner as a follower who was convinced by the co-defendant to participate. In finding a reasonable probability of a more favorable result had the information been disclosed, the court notes that the statement corroborated petitioner’s contention that he had fallen under the influence of the co-defendant who had planned the crime, and that the prosecution also failed to disclose the prior criminal history contained in the co-defendant’s juvenile records from Colorado, and the fact that a prosecution witness had been a paid informant in Utah.

Head v. Stripling
590 S.E.2d 122 (Ga. 2003)

In Georgia capital case, the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose petitioner’s confidential parole records for his prior convictions, where the records revealed that State officials and petitioner’s mother had characterized him as mentally retarded, that a State official characterized an above-average IQ test result as "questionable," and that petitioner had sub-70 IQ score on another IQ test taken when he was 16 years old. Such evidence was material given the prosecution’s assertion at trial that petitioner had recently concocted his mental retardation claim, and the prosecution relied on the above-average IQ test score as direct evidence of his actual intelligence. That the State had an alleged good motive in keeping the records from petitioner – the statutorily-imposed confidentiality of parole files – was irrelevant to the Brady claim. A state statute regarding parole file confidentiality cannot trump a capital defendant's constitutional rights.

People v. Lee
2003 WL 22100843 (Cal.App. 2003) (unpublished)

The prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose a dispatch tape containing a description of the suspect that did not match defendant. Although defendant was aware of the description because it was mentioned in a police report, and the names of officers from various jurisdictions were included in that report, defense counsel had been unable to find the source of the description and so was without admissible evidence on this issue. Once he received the dispatch tape, after defendant had been convicted, defense counsel was able to identify the officer and obtain favorable testimony. The court rejects the State’s argument that it met its Brady obligations by giving defendant notice of the description and names of possible sources. "Respondent's position here would support a prosecutor's disclosure of exculpatory statements, and a list of names of possible witnesses, accompanied by a deliberate refusal to divulge which, if any, of the listed witnesses made the exculpatory statements. This turns the important constitutional mandate of Brady into a childish game of hide-and-seek. Reasonably diligent defense counsel should be able to operate under the assumption that the prosecutor has complied with Brady at least to the extent of disclosing evidence of exculpatory statements made by police officers that were part of the investigative team in the case being prosecuted."

Ex Parte Molano
2003 WL 22349039 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003)

In case involving conviction for bodily injury to a child, record supported trial court’s grant of relief on Brady claim. Although there was no intentional suppression by the trial prosecutors, police agencies and other prosecutors in the same office were aware of written statements by witnesses that would have impeached two of the trial witnesses and supported the defense.

State v. Larkins
2003 WL 22510579 (Ohio App. 2003) (unpublished)

In robbery-murder case where no physical evidence linked defendant to the crime, the trial court properly found a Brady violation by the prosecution’s failure to disclose, inter alia, that: (1) a witness’s description of the assailant who was allegedly defendant, i.e., "Road Dog," did not match defendant; (2) this same witness claimed "Road Dog" and the codefendants were at his home at a time when a trial witness stated she was with defendant; (3) another witness provided a statement which contradicted some trial testimony, implicated a third party as being "Road Dog," and provided a possible alibi for defendant; (4) all the eyewitness descriptions obtained from people present at the crime scene differed from defendant’s appearance; and (5) the testifying co-defendant lied when asked if the prosecution had promised her anything in exchange for her testimony and about her past criminal convictions.

People v. Stokes
2003 WL 22707339 (Cal. App. 2003) (unpublished)

Defendant was denied a fair trial in case involving charges of sexual offenses where the prosecution failed to disclose a lengthy police report until nearly a year after the alleged victim’s conditional examination and the report contradicted some of the testimony given by the alleged victim during the examination. Because the victim died prior to trial, the conditional examination was offered into evidence and defendant was unable to cross-examine the witness about the police report.

Williams v. State
831 A.2d 501 (Md. App. 2003)

Brady violation is found in homicide case where the prosecution failed to disclose that jailhouse snitch was a paid police informant for a drug unit, that he received benefits in criminal cases because of his assistance to the drug unit, and that he had requested leniency from the judge in a pending criminal case based in part on his testimony against petitioner. Although neither the trial prosecutor nor the homicide investigators were aware of this information, under the circumstances of this case – which included the fact that a judge had notified the prosecutor’s office of the informant’s requests for leniency – the appeals court finds that "it is not unreasonable to charge the prosecution with knowledge of impeachment information about [the informant] that, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, it failed to divulge to appellant's counsel." The court explained: "When, as here, there is an obvious basis to suspect the motives and credibility of a proposed witness for the State, it may be incumbent upon the State's Attorney, in an office with many Assistant State's Attorneys, to establish a procedure to facilitate compliance with the obligation under Brady to disclose to defense material that includes information ‘casting a shadow on a government witness's credibility[.]’ Moreover, the police officers who are part of the prosecution team should be required to make some investigation into the background of the jailhouse snitch." (Footnote and citation omitted.) In finding that the undisclosed information was material, the court pointed out that the snitch provided direct evidence against petitioner and that the only other direct evidence was from a witness whose testimony was confused and contradictory.

Babich v. State
2004 WL 1327986 (Minn. App. 2004) (unpublished)

In drug sale and possession case, prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose the full statement of the key witness which contradicted trial testimony by the witness and a police officer claiming that the witness had not mentioned petitioner’s drug activities during an initial interview. The full statement was also exculpatory in that it contained a basis for suggesting that someone other than petitioner could have had exclusive control over the methamphetamine petitioner was charged with possessing and selling.

Toro v. State
2004 WL 1541917 (R.I.Super. 2004) (unpublished)

Under Rhode Island’s "variable standard for applying Brady," a new trial is granted automatically where there was a deliberate failure to disclose by the state regardless of the degree of harm. Here, defendant was entitled to a new trial based on an investigating officer’s failure to disclose to the defense that an uninterested witness claimed that a key prosecution witness had admitted to him that he had not actually seen defendant commit the murder. That the prosecutor was ignorant about this new witness was irrelevant, as was the alleged "good faith" of the officer who claimed to have withheld the information because he concluded it was not credible.

Commonwealth v. Adams
2004 WL 1588108 (Mass. Super. 2004)

Petitioner who had been convicted of murder and robbery was entitled to a new trial based on the prosecution’s suppression of evidence including the prior criminal records of Commonwealth witnesses, and police notes and reports showing prior inconsistent statements of a key Commonwealth witness.

People v. Stein
2004 WL 1770418 (N.Y.A.D. 2004)

Defendant who had been convicted of numerous sexual offenses, as well as endangering the welfare of a child, was entitled to a new trial based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose that two of the complainants had filed notices of civil claims against defendant’s employer, a school district, attempting to hold it responsible for defendant’s alleged criminal conduct. Evidence of the civil claims was highly relevant to the issue of the complainants’ credibility. The failure to disclose this evidence was aggravated by the prosecutor’s argument during summation that there was no evidence that the complainants were bringing civil lawsuits.

People v. Richardson
2004 WL 1879506 (Cal.App. 2004) (unpublished)

In case where defendant was charged with, among other things, resisting arrest and battery on peace officers, the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose a complaint against one of the arresting officers alleging that the officer used excessive force in arresting the complainant. This was material because it supported defendant’s contention that the same officer used force on him, without provocation, and then falsely claimed that the force was justified by defendant’s conduct. That the complainant recanted his story when ultimately interviewed by the defense did not defeat the Brady claim.

State v. White
680 N.W.2d 362 (Wisc. App. 2004)

In armed robbery case, petitioner was entitled to post-conviction relief based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose the probationary status of the alleged victim/key prosecution witness. While the alleged victim, who was a store clerk, claimed that petitioner robbed him at gunpoint, petitioner testified that the alleged victim had willingly given him money from the cash register to compensate petitioner for a shortfall in a prior marijuana purchase. Although the jury did learn that the witness had a prior conviction, there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable verdict had the jury been given evidence showing a possible motive for the witness to shape his testimony, i.e., to avoid having his probation revoked.

State v. Bright
875 So.2d 37 (La. 2004)

Second degree murder conviction reversed where prosecution suppressed evidence of its key witness’s criminal history, including the fact that he was on parole at the time of his identification of petitioner, and could have been subject to parole revocation due to his drinking at the time of the offense. In concluding that the suppressed evidence was material the court noted that no physical evidence or other witnesses implicated petitioner, and the defense alibi witnesses had been impeached by their prior criminal convictions.

State v. Hill
597 S.E.2d 822 (S.C. App. 2004)

Trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that Brady and the state discovery statute did not apply in probation revocation proceedings. The Probation Department was required to disclose exculpatory documents in the possession of investigating agencies, even though it was a separate entity from those agencies. The suppressed evidence was found to be material even though it had been considered during a motion for reconsideration that was denied. The court reasoned: "Having already found Hill violated his probation and having imposed a sentence, we believe it would have been difficult for the court to be completely objective during the subsequent proceeding." Further, Hill was denied the opportunity to thoroughly cross-examine the witnesses when armed with full information.

State v. Martinez
86 P.3d 1210 (Wash. App. 2004)

Prosecution violated Brady by withholding an exculpatory police report until shortly before it rested its case. "The State prosecutor’s withholding of exculpatory evidence until the middle of a criminal jury trial is . . . so repugnant to principles of fundamental fairness that it constitutes a violation of due process." Defendant had been charged with being an accomplice to numerous crimes. The actual perpetrators claimed that defendant had been the mastermind and had provided them with the two guns used in the offense – one black, one silver. A co-worker of defendant was shown a line-up of guns and picked out the guns recovered by the perpetrators as the guns shown to her by defendant in December 1999 which he had offered to sell to her. What the prosecution failed to reveal until well into the trial was a police report establishing that the silver gun had been owned by a third party who had not reported it stolen until October 2000. Thus, the silver gun earlier possessed by defendant, which he had reported stolen in the summer of 2000, could not have been the gun recovered by one of the perpetrators. On this record, where the jury hung 10-2 in favor of acquittal, the appeals court concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the refiled charges as a sanction for the prosecution’s misconduct.

State v. Johnson
599 S.E.2d 599 (N.C. App. 2004)

Trial court erred in violation of defendant’s rights under Brady v. Maryland in this sexual offenses case when it failed to order that defendant be provided with Department of Social Service records concerning the minor victim which indicated: (1) the victim’s brother had a history of physical violence; (2) the victim and her brother suffered yeast infections at the same time; (3) the victim and her brother were sometimes left in the house alone together; (4) the victim admitted lying to a social worker on one occasion about injuries; and (5) the victim’s mother believed that she could have caused at least one of the victim’s injuries.

Commonwealth v. Vettraino
2004 WL 2320319 (Ky. App. Oct. 15, 2004) (unpublished)

Grant of post-conviction relief upheld where detective remained silent when prosecution argued that petitioner’s defense – that he only shot the two victims after the surviving victim raised his arm revealing a silver gun – was unbelievable because no such gun was found at the crime scene. In fact, the detective had discovered a silver gun in the male victim’s night stand. By smelling and examining it, the detective concluded it hadn’t been fired. He also found it to be irrelevant because he saw no blood trail leading from the kitchen, where the shooting occurred, to the night stand. The evidence was material because defense counsel would have tested for blood between the kitchen and night stand.

Herndon v. Commonwealth
2004 WL 2634420 (Ky. App. Nov. 19, 2004) (unpublished)

In sexual abuse case, investigating detective is found to have lied in order to mislead the jury.

Mordenti v. State
894 So.2d 161 (Fla. 2004) (capital case)

In murder-for-hire case where the prosecution’s case turned almost completely on the testimony of petitioner’s former wife, the prosecution violated Brady by failing to turn over the ex-wife’s date book which contradicted part of her testimony and affected the credibility of other parts of her testimony. In addition, an entry on the date of the murder implicated the ex-wife’s then boy friend in the killing. The prosecution also violated Brady by failing to turn over the results of an interview with the lawyer who had represented the victim’s husband who had been charged with hiring petitioner to commit the murder. (The victim’s husband had committed suicide prior to trial and the trial court, unbeknownst to defense counsel, issued an ex parte order finding that the attorney- client privilege no longer applied and ordering the attorney to submit to an interview with the State.) The attorney revealed in the interview that petitioner’s ex-wife and the victim’s husband had had an affair and the victim’s husband believed that the ex-wife had orchestrated the murder. The victim’s husband had also claimed that a phone call to petitioner on the day of the murder was related to business and had been set up by the ex- wife. This was consistent with petitioner’s explanation about the call. Even if the attorney’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay, it was nevertheless material because it would have led defense counsel to discover evidence for impeaching the ex-wife. Further, the testimony may have been admissible for impeachment purposes. “Cumulatively, the total picture in this case-the State's Brady violations in failing to disclose [the ex-wife’s] date book and the undisclosed information obtained from [the attorney’s] interview with the State, in addition to other Brady violations where the State failed to disclose information obtained from interviews with key witnesses coupled with misrepresentations by the prosecutor-compels us to grant Mordenti relief in the instant case.”

Prewitt v. State
819 N.E.2d 393 (Ind. App. 2004)

In murder case involving the death of the defendant’s husband, who the defendant claimed she found dead in the bathroom with a gunshot wound in the head after she awoke from a blackout, the prosecution violated Brady by suppressing evidence that could have supported a third party guilt defense. Without the evidence, the only available defense had been suicide. A State detective had indicated that there was no exculpatory evidence, but withheld the following information: (1) the known presence of defendant’s son at the crime scene during a key time period coupled with statements that he went by a witness’s house and said that he would be going to California if something happened that night and then left a blood trail from there back to the bar where he was later seen; (2) a witness’s statement that the son and a friend moved the victim’s body, which was consistent with crime scene evidence; and (3) witness statement that the son had hired him to beat up the victim. The defendant was not guilty of lack of due diligence in obtaining this information because the State had misrepresented the status and results of its investigation. Although the body moving evidence was not independently material, it was found to fall under Brady as a part of a cumulative analysis.

Floyd v. State
902 So.2d 775 (Fla. 2005) (capital case)

In robbery-murder case with an African-American defendant, prosecution violated Brady by suppressing statements of a neighbor who saw two white men park their truck in the victim’s driveway and enter the victim’s house, heard “scrambling” noises while the men were inside, and saw the men leave hurriedly, all within the time period the medical examiner had estimated as the time of death. This was Brady evidence particularly when combined with other evidence in police reports that was inconsistent with the State’s presentation at trial, including inconsistencies in reports of pry marks on interior window frames, and arguments regarding the presence of Negroid hair on the victim’s sheet despite the fact that the bed was made at the time of the crime. Also suppressed were letters written by a jailhouse snitch seeking a bonus for his help. The court found that the Brady evidence warranted relief, despite the fact that it did not amount to “irrefutable evidence” or “smoking gun” for innocence. (The evidence against the defendant included his ownership of a coat which contained a sock with the victim’s blood on it and his having cashed a check belonging to the victim.)

Tillman v. State
128 P.3d 1123 (Utah 2005) (capital case)

Petitioner was entitled to relief from his death sentence where, following conclusion of federal habeas proceeding and while execution date was active, petitioner discovered partial transcripts of pre-trial interviews conducted with state’s star witness. Because the State had affirmatively represented that no recordations of interviews had been made, petitioner was not under an obligation during the first round of post-conviction proceedings to have found them and petitioner demonstrated good cause under state common law to overcome the procedural default of his Brady claim. The key witness, who was present at the crime scene, was granted complete immunity and presented the only evidence against petitioner. The transcript contained indications that the witness was not as certain about the sequence of events as she was at trial; evidence that an officer was attempting to coach her testimony; inappropriate laughter when recounting details of the gruesome murder; and evidence that petitioner was suicidal prior to the incident. The evidence was material as to the sentence because discrepancies, coaching, and laughter tended to decrease the witness’s credibility and therefore could have increased the jury’s perception of her moral culpability. If the witness was more culpable than she indicated, the State’s attempt to portray her as an innocent victim under the sway of petitioner would have been undermined. An increase in her moral culpability could also have underscored to the jury the disparate treatment of granting the witness full immunity while sentencing petitioner to death. Evidence of petitioner’s suicidal ideation was found to be mitigating.

State v. Lindsey
844 So.2d 961 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2003)

In homicide case where the defense at trial centered on petitioner’s intoxication, the prosecution violated Brady by failing to reveal that two witnesses who testified to petitioner’s sobriety at trial had previously stated that he was intoxicated at the time of the shooting. Although petitioner’s trial counsel could not be found, and so there was no definitive proof that the prior statements had not been disclosed to him, the appellate court rejected the trial court’s conclusion that petitioner had failed to meet his burden of establishing suppression. The trial prosecutor, who had not been on the case throughout the proceedings, testified that she would have turned over the statements had she been aware of them. Given that defense counsel presented an intoxication defense but did not impeach the witnesses with the prior statements, the prosecutor presumed that defense counsel did not receive the statements. Further, the prosecution’s file indicated that the State's answer to discovery was that the defense was not entitled to the witnesses’ statements. Finally, the suppressed statements were material under Brady, contrary to the finding of the trial court.

Keeter v. State
105 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. App. - Waco 2003)

In case involving charges that defendant sexual abused his stepdaughter, his claim of Brady error was properly preserved through his amended motion for new trial which was accompanied by an affidavit from the victim’s stepmother stating that the victim had changed her story so many times that she was not believed by the stepmother, and that the prosecutor told the stepmother that she would not be called as a witness in light of her disbelief of the victim. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for new trial, it is found that the prosecution suppressed favorable evidence that neither the victim’s father nor her stepmother believed the victim, that they thought she was a constant liar, and that the victim had made contradictory statements to them about defendant. This evidence was material given that the case against defendant rested on the testimony of the victim, and the suppressed evidence could have raised doubts about the victim’s credibility. The court squarely rejects the argument that the evidence did not have to be disclosed because it could have been discovered by defense counsel acting with due diligence. "The cases do not hold that the prosecution is relieved of its duty under Brady to disclose exculpatory evidence when defense counsel (a) knows or should know a witness exists, and (b) might discover the exculpatory evidence if defense counsel asks the right questions of the witness. Implementation of such a rule could effectively undermine Brady because it would almost always relieve the prosecutor of disclosing Brady information."

State v. VanWinkle
2003 WL 1798945 (Neb.App. April 8, 2003)(unpublished)

In case involving charges of burglary and criminal mischief, the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland when it suppressed a letter written by its key prosecution witness – who was the alleged accomplice– which stated that defendant was innocent of the crimes. The fact that the information was not sought by Van Winkle through a discovery request was irrelevant. And the letter was not cumulative to other evidence which also impeached the alleged accomplice. "The fact [the alleged accomplice] was impeached to a degree by evidence that he had lied when he accused VanWinkle of another similar crime in Palmer, that he was an unwilling witness testifying under the threat of prosecution for additional crimes, and that he had told [another person] that VanWinkle was not there is not the same as a written statement to the prosecutor that [the alleged accomplice] was lying when he accused VanWinkle of the crime."

People v. Kazakevicius
2003 WL 21190612 (Mich.App. May 20, 2003)(unpublished)

In case involving charges of criminal sexual conduct, a Brady violation occurred when the prosecution effectively suppressed the alleged victim’s counseling records that "could be read to indicate that the victim had suppressed her memories of the alleged sexual abuse for several years; that it was through counseling that these memories resurfaced; that the victim still did not have a complete memory of what allegedly happened; and that the victim's memories may have been triggered by a form of hypnosis during counseling." (The records were in the possession of the prosecution and the trial court denied defendant’s request for in camera review of the records.) The counseling records were material given that the victim's testimony was the principal evidence against defendant, and the counseling records "would have allowed defendant to explore possible alternative explanations for the origin of the allegations of sexual abuse, including whether they were the product of outside influences affecting both the reliability of the allegations and the credibility of the victim."

Brownlow v. Schofield
587 S.E.2d 647 (Ga. 2003)

Prosecutor violated Brady in child molestation case by failing to reveal that during an interview 10 days before trial the alleged victim shook his head negatively when asked by the prosecutor whether the defendant had committed oral sodomy on him. The trial court erred in denying relief on the ground that the prosecution had disclosed to the defense similar and more weighty exculpatory evidence, i.e., a videotape of an earlier interview with the alleged victim in which he denied that any improper touching occurred. Given that the only evidence of defendant’s guilt was the alleged victim’s trial testimony claiming oral sodomy had occurred, there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable verdict on that count had the prosecutor disclosed the second denial.

State v. Greco
862 So.2d 1152 (La. App. 2003)

In non-capital robbery-murder case where the defendant had claimed self-defense, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the defendant was entitled to relief based upon the recantations of two prosecution witnesses and their claims that law enforcement officers and the prosecutor’s investigator suborned perjury. The witnesses testified in post-conviction proceedings that the prosecution’s key witness was the one who stated he planned to "roll" the victim, and that they had falsely attributed the remark to defendant at trial because of threats by authorities. The credibility of trial testimony by the officers regarding the circumstances of taking defendant's confession, in which a detective admitted paraphrasing certain statements and omitting others, was sufficiently undermined and called into doubt the validity of other statements and the confession, thus entitling defendant to a new trial.

State v. Bennett
81 P.3d 1 (Nev. 2003)

The prosecution committed a Brady violation where it failed to disclose a statement by a jailhouse informant that the co-defendant had admitted that he planned the murder of the victims during the robbery and had convinced petitioner to do the killing. Although the statement was obtained after the jury returned a death verdict against petitioner, it was before formal sentencing and its revelation to petitioner when it was obtained would have entitled petitioner to a new penalty hearing. The statement was favorable at the sentencing stage in that: (1) it was relevant to refute the aggravating circumstance that the murder was random and without apparent motive; and (2) it provided mitigating evidence by characterizing petitioner as a follower who was convinced by the co-defendant to participate. In finding a reasonable probability of a more favorable result had the information been disclosed, the court notes that the statement corroborated petitioner’s contention that he had fallen under the influence of the co-defendant who had planned the crime, and that the prosecution also failed to disclose the prior criminal history contained in the co-defendant’s juvenile records from Colorado, and the fact that a prosecution witness had been a paid informant in Utah.

Head v. Stripling
590 S.E.2d 122 (Ga. 2003)

In Georgia capital case, the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose petitioner’s confidential parole records for his prior convictions, where the records revealed that State officials and petitioner’s mother had characterized him as mentally retarded, that a State official characterized an above-average IQ test result as "questionable," and that petitioner had sub-70 IQ score on another IQ test taken when he was 16 years old. Such evidence was material given the prosecution’s assertion at trial that petitioner had recently concocted his mental retardation claim, and the prosecution relied on the above-average IQ test score as direct evidence of his actual intelligence. That the State had an alleged good motive in keeping the records from petitioner – the statutorily-imposed confidentiality of parole files – was irrelevant to the Brady claim. A state statute regarding parole file confidentiality cannot trump a capital defendant's constitutional rights.

People v. Lee
2003 WL 22100843 (Cal.App. 2003) (unpublished)

The prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose a dispatch tape containing a description of the suspect that did not match defendant. Although defendant was aware of the description because it was mentioned in a police report, and the names of officers from various jurisdictions were included in that report, defense counsel had been unable to find the source of the description and so was without admissible evidence on this issue. Once he received the dispatch tape, after defendant had been convicted, defense counsel was able to identify the officer and obtain favorable testimony. The court rejects the State’s argument that it met its Brady obligations by giving defendant notice of the description and names of possible sources. "Respondent's position here would support a prosecutor's disclosure of exculpatory statements, and a list of names of possible witnesses, accompanied by a deliberate refusal to divulge which, if any, of the listed witnesses made the exculpatory statements. This turns the important constitutional mandate of Brady into a childish game of hide-and-seek. Reasonably diligent defense counsel should be able to operate under the assumption that the prosecutor has complied with Brady at least to the extent of disclosing evidence of exculpatory statements made by police officers that were part of the investigative team in the case being prosecuted."

Ex Parte Molano
2003 WL 22349039 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003)

In case involving conviction for bodily injury to a child, record supported trial court’s grant of relief on Brady claim. Although there was no intentional suppression by the trial prosecutors, police agencies and other prosecutors in the same office were aware of written statements by witnesses that would have impeached two of the trial witnesses and supported the defense.

State v. Larkins
2003 WL 22510579 (Ohio App. 2003) (unpublished)

In robbery-murder case where no physical evidence linked defendant to the crime, the trial court properly found a Brady violation by the prosecution’s failure to disclose, inter alia, that: (1) a witness’s description of the assailant who was allegedly defendant, i.e., "Road Dog," did not match defendant; (2) this same witness claimed "Road Dog" and the codefendants were at his home at a time when a trial witness stated she was with defendant; (3) another witness provided a statement which contradicted some trial testimony, implicated a third party as being "Road Dog," and provided a possible alibi for defendant; (4) all the eyewitness descriptions obtained from people present at the crime scene differed from defendant’s appearance; and (5) the testifying co-defendant lied when asked if the prosecution had promised her anything in exchange for her testimony and about her past criminal convictions.

People v. Stokes
2003 WL 22707339 (Cal. App. 2003) (unpublished)

Defendant was denied a fair trial in case involving charges of sexual offenses where the prosecution failed to disclose a lengthy police report until nearly a year after the alleged victim’s conditional examination and the report contradicted some of the testimony given by the alleged victim during the examination. Because the victim died prior to trial, the conditional examination was offered into evidence and defendant was unable to cross-examine the witness about the police report.

Williams v. State
831 A.2d 501 (Md. App. 2003)

Brady violation is found in homicide case where the prosecution failed to disclose that jailhouse snitch was a paid police informant for a drug unit, that he received benefits in criminal cases because of his assistance to the drug unit, and that he had requested leniency from the judge in a pending criminal case based in part on his testimony against petitioner. Although neither the trial prosecutor nor the homicide investigators were aware of this information, under the circumstances of this case – which included the fact that a judge had notified the prosecutor’s office of the informant’s requests for leniency – the appeals court finds that "it is not unreasonable to charge the prosecution with knowledge of impeachment information about [the informant] that, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, it failed to divulge to appellant's counsel." The court explained: "When, as here, there is an obvious basis to suspect the motives and credibility of a proposed witness for the State, it may be incumbent upon the State's Attorney, in an office with many Assistant State's Attorneys, to establish a procedure to facilitate compliance with the obligation under Brady to disclose to defense material that includes information ‘casting a shadow on a government witness's credibility[.]’ Moreover, the police officers who are part of the prosecution team should be required to make some investigation into the background of the jailhouse snitch." (Footnote and citation omitted.) In finding that the undisclosed information was material, the court pointed out that the snitch provided direct evidence against petitioner and that the only other direct evidence was from a witness whose testimony was confused and contradictory.

Babich v. State
2004 WL 1327986 (Minn. App. 2004) (unpublished)

In drug sale and possession case, prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose the full statement of the key witness which contradicted trial testimony by the witness and a police officer claiming that the witness had not mentioned petitioner’s drug activities during an initial interview. The full statement was also exculpatory in that it contained a basis for suggesting that someone other than petitioner could have had exclusive control over the methamphetamine petitioner was charged with possessing and selling.

Toro v. State
2004 WL 1541917 (R.I.Super. 2004) (unpublished)

Under Rhode Island’s "variable standard for applying Brady," a new trial is granted automatically where there was a deliberate failure to disclose by the state regardless of the degree of harm. Here, defendant was entitled to a new trial based on an investigating officer’s failure to disclose to the defense that an uninterested witness claimed that a key prosecution witness had admitted to him that he had not actually seen defendant commit the murder. That the prosecutor was ignorant about this new witness was irrelevant, as was the alleged "good faith" of the officer who claimed to have withheld the information because he concluded it was not credible.

Commonwealth v. Adams
2004 WL 1588108 (Mass. Super. 2004)

Petitioner who had been convicted of murder and robbery was entitled to a new trial based on the prosecution’s suppression of evidence including the prior criminal records of Commonwealth witnesses, and police notes and reports showing prior inconsistent statements of a key Commonwealth witness.

People v. Stein
2004 WL 1770418 (N.Y.A.D. 2004)

Defendant who had been convicted of numerous sexual offenses, as well as endangering the welfare of a child, was entitled to a new trial based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose that two of the complainants had filed notices of civil claims against defendant’s employer, a school district, attempting to hold it responsible for defendant’s alleged criminal conduct. Evidence of the civil claims was highly relevant to the issue of the complainants’ credibility. The failure to disclose this evidence was aggravated by the prosecutor’s argument during summation that there was no evidence that the complainants were bringing civil lawsuits.

People v. Richardson
2004 WL 1879506 (Cal.App. 2004) (unpublished)

In case where defendant was charged with, among other things, resisting arrest and battery on peace officers, the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose a complaint against one of the arresting officers alleging that the officer used excessive force in arresting the complainant. This was material because it supported defendant’s contention that the same officer used force on him, without provocation, and then falsely claimed that the force was justified by defendant’s conduct. That the complainant recanted his story when ultimately interviewed by the defense did not defeat the Brady claim.

State v. White
680 N.W.2d 362 (Wisc. App. 2004)

In armed robbery case, petitioner was entitled to post-conviction relief based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose the probationary status of the alleged victim/key prosecution witness. While the alleged victim, who was a store clerk, claimed that petitioner robbed him at gunpoint, petitioner testified that the alleged victim had willingly given him money from the cash register to compensate petitioner for a shortfall in a prior marijuana purchase. Although the jury did learn that the witness had a prior conviction, there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable verdict had the jury been given evidence showing a possible motive for the witness to shape his testimony, i.e., to avoid having his probation revoked.

State v. Bright
875 So.2d 37 (La. 2004)

Second degree murder conviction reversed where prosecution suppressed evidence of its key witness’s criminal history, including the fact that he was on parole at the time of his identification of petitioner, and could have been subject to parole revocation due to his drinking at the time of the offense. In concluding that the suppressed evidence was material the court noted that no physical evidence or other witnesses implicated petitioner, and the defense alibi witnesses had been impeached by their prior criminal convictions.

State v. Hill
597 S.E.2d 822 (S.C. App. 2004)

Trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that Brady and the state discovery statute did not apply in probation revocation proceedings. The Probation Department was required to disclose exculpatory documents in the possession of investigating agencies, even though it was a separate entity from those agencies. The suppressed evidence was found to be material even though it had been considered during a motion for reconsideration that was denied. The court reasoned: "Having already found Hill violated his probation and having imposed a sentence, we believe it would have been difficult for the court to be completely objective during the subsequent proceeding." Further, Hill was denied the opportunity to thoroughly cross-examine the witnesses when armed with full information.

State v. Martinez
86 P.3d 1210 (Wash. App. 2004)

Prosecution violated Brady by withholding an exculpatory police report until shortly before it rested its case. "The State prosecutor’s withholding of exculpatory evidence until the middle of a criminal jury trial is . . . so repugnant to principles of fundamental fairness that it constitutes a violation of due process." Defendant had been charged with being an accomplice to numerous crimes. The actual perpetrators claimed that defendant had been the mastermind and had provided them with the two guns used in the offense – one black, one silver. A co-worker of defendant was shown a line-up of guns and picked out the guns recovered by the perpetrators as the guns shown to her by defendant in December 1999 which he had offered to sell to her. What the prosecution failed to reveal until well into the trial was a police report establishing that the silver gun had been owned by a third party who had not reported it stolen until October 2000. Thus, the silver gun earlier possessed by defendant, which he had reported stolen in the summer of 2000, could not have been the gun recovered by one of the perpetrators. On this record, where the jury hung 10-2 in favor of acquittal, the appeals court concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the refiled charges as a sanction for the prosecution’s misconduct.

State v. Johnson
599 S.E.2d 599 (N.C. App. 2004)

Trial court erred in violation of defendant’s rights under Brady v. Maryland in this sexual offenses case when it failed to order that defendant be provided with Department of Social Service records concerning the minor victim which indicated: (1) the victim’s brother had a history of physical violence; (2) the victim and her brother suffered yeast infections at the same time; (3) the victim and her brother were sometimes left in the house alone together; (4) the victim admitted lying to a social worker on one occasion about injuries; and (5) the victim’s mother believed that she could have caused at least one of the victim’s injuries.

Commonwealth v. Vettraino
2004 WL 2320319 (Ky. App. Oct. 15, 2004) (unpublished)

Grant of post-conviction relief upheld where detective remained silent when prosecution argued that petitioner’s defense – that he only shot the two victims after the surviving victim raised his arm revealing a silver gun – was unbelievable because no such gun was found at the crime scene. In fact, the detective had discovered a silver gun in the male victim’s night stand. By smelling and examining it, the detective concluded it hadn’t been fired. He also found it to be irrelevant because he saw no blood trail leading from the kitchen, where the shooting occurred, to the night stand. The evidence was material because defense counsel would have tested for blood between the kitchen and night stand.

Herndon v. Commonwealth
2004 WL 2634420 (Ky. App. Nov. 19, 2004) (unpublished)

In sexual abuse case, investigating detective is found to have lied in order to mislead the jury.

Mordenti v. State
894 So.2d 161 (Fla. 2004) (capital case)

In murder-for-hire case where the prosecution’s case turned almost completely on the testimony of petitioner’s former wife, the prosecution violated Brady by failing to turn over the ex-wife’s date book which contradicted part of her testimony and affected the credibility of other parts of her testimony. In addition, an entry on the date of the murder implicated the ex-wife’s then boy friend in the killing. The prosecution also violated Brady by failing to turn over the results of an interview with the lawyer who had represented the victim’s husband who had been charged with hiring petitioner to commit the murder. (The victim’s husband had committed suicide prior to trial and the trial court, unbeknownst to defense counsel, issued an ex parte order finding that the attorney- client privilege no longer applied and ordering the attorney to submit to an interview with the State.) The attorney revealed in the interview that petitioner’s ex-wife and the victim’s husband had had an affair and the victim’s husband believed that the ex-wife had orchestrated the murder. The victim’s husband had also claimed that a phone call to petitioner on the day of the murder was related to business and had been set up by the ex- wife. This was consistent with petitioner’s explanation about the call. Even if the attorney’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay, it was nevertheless material because it would have led defense counsel to discover evidence for impeaching the ex-wife. Further, the testimony may have been admissible for impeachment purposes. “Cumulatively, the total picture in this case-the State's Brady violations in failing to disclose [the ex-wife’s] date book and the undisclosed information obtained from [the attorney’s] interview with the State, in addition to other Brady violations where the State failed to disclose information obtained from interviews with key witnesses coupled with misrepresentations by the prosecutor-compels us to grant Mordenti relief in the instant case.”

Prewitt v. State
819 N.E.2d 393 (Ind. App. 2004)

In murder case involving the death of the defendant’s husband, who the defendant claimed she found dead in the bathroom with a gunshot wound in the head after she awoke from a blackout, the prosecution violated Brady by suppressing evidence that could have supported a third party guilt defense. Without the evidence, the only available defense had been suicide. A State detective had indicated that there was no exculpatory evidence, but withheld the following information: (1) the known presence of defendant’s son at the crime scene during a key time period coupled with statements that he went by a witness’s house and said that he would be going to California if something happened that night and then left a blood trail from there back to the bar where he was later seen; (2) a witness’s statement that the son and a friend moved the victim’s body, which was consistent with crime scene evidence; and (3) witness statement that the son had hired him to beat up the victim. The defendant was not guilty of lack of due diligence in obtaining this information because the State had misrepresented the status and results of its investigation. Although the body moving evidence was not independently material, it was found to fall under Brady as a part of a cumulative analysis.

Floyd v. State
902 So.2d 775 (Fla. 2005) (capital case)

In robbery-murder case with an African-American defendant, prosecution violated Brady by suppressing statements of a neighbor who saw two white men park their truck in the victim’s driveway and enter the victim’s house, heard “scrambling” noises while the men were inside, and saw the men leave hurriedly, all within the time period the medical examiner had estimated as the time of death. This was Brady evidence particularly when combined with other evidence in police reports that was inconsistent with the State’s presentation at trial, including inconsistencies in reports of pry marks on interior window frames, and arguments regarding the presence of Negroid hair on the victim’s sheet despite the fact that the bed was made at the time of the crime. Also suppressed were letters written by a jailhouse snitch seeking a bonus for his help. The court found that the Brady evidence warranted relief, despite the fact that it did not amount to “irrefutable evidence” or “smoking gun” for innocence. (The evidence against the defendant included his ownership of a coat which contained a sock with the victim’s blood on it and his having cashed a check belonging to the victim.)

Tillman v. State
128 P.3d 1123 (Utah 2005) (capital case)

Petitioner was entitled to relief from his death sentence where, following conclusion of federal habeas proceeding and while execution date was active, petitioner discovered partial transcripts of pre-trial interviews conducted with state’s star witness. Because the State had affirmatively represented that no recordations of interviews had been made, petitioner was not under an obligation during the first round of post-conviction proceedings to have found them and petitioner demonstrated good cause under state common law to overcome the procedural default of his Brady claim. The key witness, who was present at the crime scene, was granted complete immunity and presented the only evidence against petitioner. The transcript contained indications that the witness was not as certain about the sequence of events as she was at trial; evidence that an officer was attempting to coach her testimony; inappropriate laughter when recounting details of the gruesome murder; and evidence that petitioner was suicidal prior to the incident. The evidence was material as to the sentence because discrepancies, coaching, and laughter tended to decrease the witness’s credibility and therefore could have increased the jury’s perception of her moral culpability. If the witness was more culpable than she indicated, the State’s attempt to portray her as an innocent victim under the sway of petitioner would have been undermined. An increase in her moral culpability could also have underscored to the jury the disparate treatment of granting the witness full immunity while sentencing petitioner to death. Evidence of petitioner’s suicidal ideation was found to be mitigating.

McCarty v. State
114 P.3d 1089 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 660 (2005) (capital case)

Post-conviction relief granted in rape-murder case because of the conduct of forensic analyst Joyce Gilchrist, who withheld evidence, most likely destroyed exculpatory evidence, provided flawed analysis and documentation, testified in a manner that exceeded the limits of forensic science, and altered lab reports to avoid detection.

Bowlds v. State
834 N.E.2d 669 (Ind. App. 2005)

In case of criminal recklessness resulting in serious bodily injury, the prosecution's suppression of three police reports violated Brady. The reports included information about the arrest of another suspect matching the description of the assailant, incriminating statements by another person present at the scene, hearsay statements regarding culpability of a third possible suspect, and prior-conviction impeachment material concerning two witnesses who identified petitioner in a lineup.

People v. Garcia
2005 WL 2387474 (Cal. App. Sept. 29, 2005) (unpublished)

In attempted murder case, the prosecution’s failure to disclose a letter requesting leniency for a witness for his participation in the case and requesting his placement in a witness protection program, when considered in combination with misconduct by the prosecutor during argument, justifies a new trial. At trial, the witness had claimed that he was testifying because he received a deal that released him from juvenile hall. The lead investigator testified that the State had requested leniency for the witness in a separate case. With regard to another witness, the investigator testified that she was absolutely sure of her photo identification while the witness said she had equivocated. It is found that the suppressed information would have assisted in the impeachment of one witness and also have damaged the credibility of the investigator with regard to the disputed circumstances of the other witness’ photo identification.

Robinson v. Commonwealth
181 S.W.3d 30 (Ky. 2005)

Napue violation occurred at the sentencing proceedings following defendant’s conviction for various drug offenses when the parole officer erroneously testified that good time credits would be factored into the parole eligibility date and the prosecutor not only failed to correct this incorrect information in his argument to the jury, but relied heavily on the parole officer’s testimony in arguing that the jury should impose the maximum penalty.

People v. Blackman
836 N.E.2d 101 (Ill. App. 2005)

State violated Brady when it failed to disclose the payment of $20,000 in relocation expenses to a witness where the witness in question was one of only two to put defendant at the scene and the only one who was not chemically impaired at the time. Nondisclosure of information prevented defendant from the impeaching witness and making a knowing choice of jury trial over bench trial. Court’s offer of continuance following disclosure of information insufficient to cure error.

People v. Proventud
802 N.Y.S.2d 605 (N.Y. Sup. 2005)

In attempted murder case, prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose that the victim identified defendant’s brother in a photo array and wrote down “looks like him.” Notably, the conduct of the jury during trial indicated that identification was a major issue. Relief was required despite the fact that the identification was tentative and that defendant’s brother was incarcerated at the time of the crime.

Schofield v. Palmer
621 S.E.2d 726 (Ga. 2005) (capital case)

Despite the existence of “considerable” evidence implicating petitioner in the murders of his estranged wife and step-daughter, habeas relief was required based on the prosecution’s suppression of evidence that the Georgia Bureau of Investigation had paid a witness $500 for providing information implicating petitioner. Petitioner’s nephew testified that he went to the victims’s home with petitioner, cut the phone lines at petitioner’s request, and petitioner then kicked in the door and shot the victims. The defense theory was that the nephew alone was responsible for the crime. The witness at issue testified to seeing petitioner’s car parked in the location described by the nephew. Evidence of the payment was material because it provided a basis for impeaching the witness. Suppression of the evidence provided cause to overcome the procedural default of the claim.

Commonwealth v. Lykus
2005 WL 3804726 (Mass. Super. Dec. 30, 2005)

In kidnaping and murder case where evidence against defendant included dye from ransom money that was found in his car and on his belongings, same kind of bags that ransom money was in were found in his truck, bullets in victim were consistent with those fired from his gun, and several witnesses identified his voice on tapes demanding ransom money, a Brady violation is found from the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose FBI lab reports indicating that defendant’s voice could not be conclusively established to be the voice on the tapes. Although the prosecutor had requested production of this evidence, supervisors at the FBI specifically directed agents not to produce it. The suppression of the lab reports is nonetheless imputed to the Commonwealth because the FBI had been “intimately involved” in the investigation of the case. Even if the suppression could not be imputed to the Commonwealth, the lab reports would then be considered newly discovered and still provide grounds for a new trial given that the voice identification was a “major component” of the case against defendant.

State v. Scheidel
844 N.E.2d 1248 (Ohio 2006)

In prosecution for kidnaping, rape and attempted rape, the prosecution violated Brady by suppressing notes from an interview with the child victim before trial, in which the child stated that defendant did not penetrate her vagina. Materiality is found even though the notes did not constitute a “statement” by the victim and despite a clear description by the child of the rape to a nurse, evidence of vaginal scarring, and testimony by a friend of the defendant who claimed on one occasion to have walked into the child’s room and discovered the defendant with his pants down standing over the bed of the naked, crying child.

State v. Larkins
2006 WL 60778 (Ohio App. Jan. 12, 2006) (unpublished)

Indictment on robbery charges is dismissed where defendant’s initial conviction was overturned based on the State ‘s failure to disclose a wealth of Brady material and the defendant now would be unable to use the information that had been suppressed because 8 defense witnesses were now deceased and 10 had no known address.

Simpson v. Moore
627 S.E.2d 701 (S.C. 2006) (capital case)

In case involving charges of robbery-murder at a convenience store, the prosecution’s failure to disclose that a bag of money was found behind the counter violated Brady. One victim/witness testified that after some shots were fired, petitioner took money from the cash register. Petitioner claimed that he “chickened out” of the robbery, only shot the owner after the owner accosted petitioner, and did not take any money from the store. The bag of money at the crime scene was determined to be critical evidence regarding the robbery charge/aggravator. A new trial was ordered on the robbery charge, with a resentencing to follow based on the outcome of that retrial.

State v. Anderson
2006 WL 825270 (Ohio App. Mar. 31, 2006) (unpublished)

DUI charges properly dismissed where defendant requested that videotapes taken of him and his interaction with police be preserved and the State destroyed them. Due to the specificity of defendant’s request, State is found to bear the burden of demonstrating that the evidence would have been wholly inculpatory, which it could not. In addition, the destroyed videotapes would have resolved several matters in dispute and provided the only possible impeachment of the officers.

Sykes v. United States
897 A.2d 769 (D.C. 2006)

Defendant convicted of robbery-murder and other charges was entitled to a new trial based on the prosecution’s failure to timely provide grand jury testimony of two witnesses, who were unavailable at the time of trial, which directly contradicted the confidential informant’s testimony with respect to defendant's alleged express and adoptive admissions. That the defendant was permitted to introduce portions of the grand jury testimony did not cure the error because the prosecutor was able to suggest that the witnesses had not been truthful before the grand jury and the jury was not able to observe the witnesses’s demeanor and make a credibility determination.

State v. Williams
896 A.2d 973 (Md. 2006)

In murder case where key prosecution witness was a jailhouse snitch, a Brady violation occurred by the suppression of evidence that the snitch was a paid informant and that he was seeking leniency in another case based on his testimony in petitioner’s case, contrary to his claim on the stand that he was testifying against petitioner solely because it was the right thing to do. Although the particular Assistant State’s Attorney prosecuting petitioner was unaware of this information, Brady mandated “that, under the circumstances of this case, the State's duty and obligation to disclose exculpatory and mitigating material and information extend beyond the individual prosecutor and encompass information known to any prosecutor in the office.” Defense counsel could not be blamed for failing to discover the impeachment evidence given that the snitch’s status as a paid informant could only have been revealed by the prosecution or the police. That defense counsel had conducted a “superb” cross-examination of the snitch failed to render the suppressed impeachment evidence immaterial.

Riddle v. Ozmint
631 S.E.2d 70 (S.C. 2006) (capital case)

In case where the capital conviction rested almost entirely on the testimony of petitioner’s mentally retarded younger brother, the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose a statement made by the brother close to a year after his original statement which contained major inconsistencies and the fact that three days before trial, the officers took the brother to the scene for a reenactment. Evidence about the trip would have underscored the defense position that the brother was unreliable and needed to be coached. The lower court’s finding that the defense could have found the statement by interviewing the officer who took it is rejected as “unrealistic” and not what Brady requires. The lower court also erred in finding that the defense could have discovered the information through the prosecution’s “open-file” policy, given that the prosecution routinely removed work product and other information on a “case-by-case” basis. In addition, because the trip occurred only three days before trial, this further hindered any attempt, even if required, to discover it. Finally, the brother testified that he had made no statements or had any contact with officers after his first statement, and the prosecutor let this testimony go uncorrected. The lower court was wrong to accept the State’s assertion that the brother simply must not have understood the question or not recalled the events.

People v. Harris
825 N.Y.S.2d 876 (N.Y. A.D. 2006)

Summary reversal of attempted murder and robbery convictions where prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory material obtained by an investigator for the Monroe County District Attorney and the subject material was Brady material because it affected the credibility of a key prosecution witness. “Reversal of defendant's judgment of conviction is required, moreover, because defendant made a specific request for such material and ‘there is a “reasonable possibility” that, had that material been disclosed, the result would have been different’”

Workman v. Commonwealth
636 S.E.2d 368 (Va. 2006)

In homicide case where defendant’s claim that victim was shot in self-defense depended on the jury believing defendant’s assertion that victim’s friend had a gun, which the friend denied, Brady violation occurred where prosecution failed to reveal that a witness in another case had brought up this case during a police interview and reported having been told that the victim’s friend had tried to pass the victim a gun during the altercation and then fled the scene with the weapon. (The police never informed the prosecutor about this statement.) Because the police failed to follow up on this witness’s statement, it was material because it would have been a powerful tool to support the defense’s contention that the police investigation was inadequate. In addition, once the defense team learned of the statement, the witness was interviewed and he revealed personal knowledge about two recent “shoot outs” involving the victim’s friend. The witness also led the defense to someone else who recounted a separate recent shooting by the victim’s friend. Thus, even if the first statement was not admissible, it was material because its disclosure would have led to exculpatory admissible evidence. There was no lack of diligence in failing to discover the first statement even though defense counsel happened to interview one of the officers who conducted the witness interview and that officer testified at trial. Under Strickler, defendant could not be faulted for relying on the Commonwealth’s “open file” response to defendant’s discovery motion. Finally, given how recent the new shooting incidents were, the evidence could not be deemed cumulative of evidence at trial about the victim’s friend pointing a weapon at a Deputy Sheriff four years earlier.

In re Sodersten
53 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 (Cal.App. 2007)

In murder case where no physical evidence directly implicated petitioner, habeas relief was granted based on the prosecution’s failure to disclose “tape-recorded statements of the two key trial witnesses that contained inconsistent statements, as well as admissions of lying and coercive interrogation of one of the witnesses.” The evidence was material even though other witnesses placed petitioner at or around the victim’s residence before and after her body was discovered, contrary to his alibi, given that the key prosecution witnesses were the only ones who identified petitioner as the victim’s attacker/killer. And the fact that one of the suppressed tapes, which was made surreptitiously when petitioner and one of the key witnesses were in custody, included statements by petitioner that conflicted with his trial alibi did not defeat materiality because petitioner offered an explanation for the conflict at the habeas hearing and he could have altered his defense at trial had the tape been disclosed. That petitioner passed away before the court of appeal ruled did not render the proceeding moot given that petitioner spent 20 years in prison for a crime he may not have committed, and the integrity of the judicial system was undermined by the prosecution’s actions.

Stewart v. Commonwealth
2007 WL 89476 (Va. App. Jan. 16, 2007) (unpublished)

Brady violation found where prosecution belatedly revealed information about a third party who could have been responsible for the check forgery that the defendant was charged with. Although the information came out during the trial, defense counsel had cross-examined several witnesses and the defendant had already testified in his own defense, “thus potentially compromising whatever alternative trial strategy the evidence might have suggested.”

Ex Parte Masonheimer
___ S.W.3d ___, 2007 WL 840780 (Tex. Crim. App. March 21, 2007)

Double jeopardy under the state and federal constitutions barred a third trial of defendant charged with murder where his prior mistrial motions were necessitated primarily by prosecution’s intentional failure to disclose exculpatory Brady evidence with the specific intent to avoid the possibility of an acquittal. The defendant contended that he killed the victim, who was his daughter’s boyfriend, in self defense. According to the defense, the victim had grown increasingly aggressive toward the daughter due to his use of anabolic steroids. Suppressed by the prosecution, among other things, was evidence that the victim had a hidden supply of steroids.

State v. Youngblood
___ S.E.2d ___, 2007 WL 1388186 (W.Va. May 10, 2007)

Following remand from the Supreme Court for full consideration of defendant’s Brady claim, defendant’s conviction for numerous sexual and weapons offenses is reversed and a new trial ordered based on the suppression of a note that corroborated the defendant’s claim that the sexual encounters were consensual and might have impeached the testimony of the alleged victim’s friends who denied knowing about sexual activity between the defendant and the alleged victim. Suppression is found given testimony that a police officer read the note and then urged the person who discovered it to destroy it. Although the prosecutor was unaware of the note, a police officer’s knowledge of it is imputed to the prosecutor.

Walker v. Johnson
___ S.E.2d ___, 2007 WL 1386891 (Ga. May 14, 2007)

In case involving various charges, including kidnaping and robbery, the prosecution violated Brady by suppressing taped statements by a witness who explained in detail why she believed the victim had actually set up the crime to recover insurance monies, by the victim, and by the defendant. Although the State did provide a one paragraph reference to the witness’s 48-page statement, this did not comply with Brady given that these notes “omitted much of the potentially exculpatory material contained in the complete transcript” and incorrectly reported that the witness had offered no justification for her belief that no crimes occurred. “Rather than informing the defense of the substantive nature of [the witness’s] statement, there is a significant likelihood that the State's incomplete and inaccurate response to Johnson's discovery and Brady motions induced defense counsel to believe either that the taped statements were not in existence or that they contained no information beneficial to the defense.” Inconsistencies in the victim’s statement would have assisted the defense during cross-examination. Finally, the defendant’s statement would have been useful at trial because in it the defendant clearly told the interrogating officer where he was at the time of the crime and who could corroborate this, which would have contradicted the officer’s trial testimony that the defendant never provided him with the names of any alibi witnesses. Suppression of the defendant’s statement permitted the prosecutor to argue that the alibi defense was recently fabricated.

Ex Parte Elliff
2007 WL 1346358 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (unpublished)

Summarily affirming grant of habeas relief in murder case where prosecution failed to disclose the existence of a witness who possessed information indicating that someone else committed the offense.