II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment,
applying the same standard that bound the district court and viewing the
evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
Rodriguez. See Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir.2006).
"Summary judgment is appropriate when `there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.'" Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).

We review de novo a district court's grant of judgment as a matter of
law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), applying the same standard that bound the
district court. Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe
County, Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1114 (11th Cir.2005). That standard requires
that we examine the evidence presented at trial in the light most
favorable to Rodriguez. Id. The district court's entry of judgment as a
matter of law in favor of Johnson was proper only if "`there [was] no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable juror to find for
[Rodriguez]'" on his Eighth Amendment claim. Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
50(a)).[fn11]

III. DISCUSSION

The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials "to protect
prisoners
Page 617
from violence at the hands of other prisoners." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833,
114 S.Ct. at 1976 (citing various courts of appeals); see Zatler v.
Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir.1986) ("[i]t is well settled that
a prison inmate has a constitutional right to be protected . . . from
physical assault by other inmates."). "[H]aving stripped [prisoners] of
virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to
outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the
state of nature take its course." Farmer, 511 U.S at 833,
114 S.Ct. at 1977.

A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when he actually
(subjectively) knows that an inmate is facing a substantial[fn12] risk of
serious harm, yet disregards that known risk by failing to respond to it
in an (objectively) reasonable manner. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829, 837,
844, 114 S.Ct. at 1974, 1979, 1982-83; see also Cottone v. Jenne,
326 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir.2003); Hale v. Tallapoosa County,
50 F.3d 1579, 15821-83 (11th Cir.1995). As with any other claim brought
under § 1983, to succeed, the inmate must demonstrate a causal connection
between the prison official's conduct and the Eighth Amendment
violation. See Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380 (11th Cir.1982);
see also LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir.1993).

With regard to the subjective component of the Eighth Amendment claim,
the Court in Farmer held that the prison "official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." 511 U.S. at 837,
114 S.Ct. at 1979. The Court also held: "Whether a prison official had
the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact
subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from
circumstantial evidence." Id. at 842, 114 S.Ct. at 1981 (emphasis
added). A prison official cannot avoid liability under the Eighth
Amendment "by showing that . . . he did not know the complainant was
especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually
committed the assault." Id. at 843, 114 S.Ct. at 1982 (emphasis added).
This is because "[t]he question under the Eighth Amendment is whether
prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner
to a sufficiently substantial `risk of serious damage to his future
health.'" Id. (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35,
113 S.Ct. 2475, 2481, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993)).

The Court in Farmer identified three ways that prison officials might
avoid Eighth Amendment liability. Officials might show: (1) "that they
did not know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently
substantial danger and that they were therefore unaware of a danger"; (2)
"that
Page 618
they knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the
risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent"; or
(3) that "they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm
ultimately was not averted." 511 U.S. at 844, 114 S.Ct. at 1982-83.

Kugler and Johnson make two arguments on appeal. First, they maintain
that they did not know any "facts indicating a sufficiently substantial
danger" and thus did not actually know that Rodriguez faced a substantial
risk of serious harm. Their argument in this regard, stated differently,
is that the concerns expressed by Rodriguez were not specific enough to
put them on actual notice of a risk of harm. Second, they maintain that
Rodriguez cannot demonstrate the requisite causal connection because they
did not, in their capacity at the April 3 meeting, have final authority
to order Rodriguez's release from close management. All they could do at
that meeting was recommend Rodriguez's release to the compound, and
this, they say, is not sufficient to support a finding that their actions
caused his subsequent injury.[fn13]

A. Summary Judgment to Kugler

1. Did Kugler Actually Know Rodriguez Faced a Substantial
Risk of Serious Harm?

The district court determined that Rodriguez could not satisfy the
subjective component of his Eighth Amendment claim and granted summary
judgment to Kugler solely on this basis.[fn14] Rodriguez argues that the
district court erred in granting summary judgment to Kugler because there
is evidence in the record from which a reasonable juror could find that
Kugler actually knew that Rodriguez faced a substantial risk of serious
harm from his former gang members. Specifically, Rodriguez says, the
summary-judgment record viewed in the light most favorable to him
demonstrates that: (1) he verbally informed Kugler on at least two
occasions that his life had been threatened by members of his former gang
and that, to avoid injury, he needed either to be transferred to another
prison or to be placed in protective custody at ECI; and that (2) he, by
means of the written Inmate Request form, informed Kugler that he feared
for his safety in the compound and requested a transfer from ECI. This,
Rodriguez says, is enough evidence of subjective knowledge to get his
claim to a jury. We agree.

Rodriguez submitted a declaration in opposition to Kugler's
summary-judgment motion in which he stated that "While in Close
Management (`CM') at ECI prior to the April 10, 2002 stabbing incident, I
learned that gang members at ECI wanted to kill me." PL's Decl. ¶ 4.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Rodriguez, this evidence gives rise
to an inference that he received threats on his life, from members of his
former gang, prior to the stabbing. Rodriguez stated in his declaration
that "verbally on at least two separate occasions [prior to the April 10
stabbing]" "I informed [Kugler] . . . of the threat made against my life
and asked that I be transferred to another correctional institution for
my protection." Id. ¶ 5 (emphasis added). Again, viewed in the light
most favorable
Page 619
to Rodriguez, the reasonable inference created by this evidence is that
the threat of which Rodriguez twice informed Kugler was the gang-related
threat referenced in the preceding paragraph of his declaration, the
threat we can infer from Rodriguez's knowledge that "gang members at ECI
wanted to kill [him]." We think that this evidence is sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Rodriguez, on
at least two occasions, told Kugler that he feared a gang member might
kill him and thus requested either a transfer from ECI or placement in
protective custody.

With regard to Rodriguez's verbal complaints, Kugler said in his
deposition that he did not remember having any conversation with
Rodriguez in which Rodriguez mentioned the threats to his life or his
need for a transfer or protective custody. Kugler's denial flatly
contradicts Rodriguez's allegations. Besides denying that such
conversations ever took place, Kugler also challenges the sufficiency of
Rodriguez's declaration on the ground that it does not "furnish any
specifics as to who was posing the alleged threats." Appellees' Br. at 6
(emphasis added). Kugler's challenge to the declaration In this respect
is without merit, however, as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Farmer:
"Nor may a prison official escape liability for deliberate indifference
by showing that . . . he did not know that the complainant was especially
likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually committed
the assault." 511 U.S. at 843, 114 S.Ct. at 1982 (emphasis added). We
conclude that Rodriguez's declaration testimony, coupled with Kugler's
inability to recall any security-related conversations with Rodriguez, is
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact about whether
Kugler had subjective knowledge that Rodriguez faced a substantial risk
of serious harm.

With regard to the submission of Rodriguez's February 18, 2002, Inmate
Request Form — in which he stated that he had "a problem with another
inmate in this compound," that he had "submitted a request for
protection," and that he "want[ed] to know . . . whether you are going to
give me a transfer" — Kugler testified in his deposition that, although
he would ordinarily have received a security-related Inmate Request form
like Rodriguez's, he never saw the one submitted by Rodriguez. Kugler's
testimony that he would ordinarily have received such a form, coupled
with his express denial that he received the one submitted on February
18, leads us to conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact
about whether Kugler was aware of the Inmate Request form prior to the
attack. This dispute of fact, in turn, is relevant to the question
whether Kugler had subjective knowledge that Rodriguez faced a
substantial risk of serious harm.[fn15]

2. Did Kugler Respond Reasonably to the Known Risk?

"[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to
inmate health
Page 620
or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably
to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." Farmer,
511 U.S. at 844, 114 S.Ct. at 1982-83. More succinctly, "prison officials
who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause." Id. at 845, 114 S.Ct. at 1983. We have said that a
prison official violates the Eighth Amendment if he responds to a known
risk "in an objectively unreasonable manner." Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1358.
An official responds to a known risk in an objectively unreasonable
manner if "he knew of ways to reduce the harm but knowingly declined to
act" or if "he knew of ways to reduce the harm but recklessly declined to
act." Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583.

Rodriguez argues on appeal that Kugler responded to the threatened risk
of harm in an objectively unreasonable manner. But the district court,
given that it granted summary judgment to Kugler solely on the basis that
Kugler lacked subjective knowledge of the risk, stopped short of
addressing this question. Moreover, Kugler does not argue on appeal that
his response was reasonable; rather, Kugler argues only that he had no
subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of harm, and/or that he was
not the cause. Because it is not necessary for us to do so, we decline to
address the objective component of Rodriguez's Eighth Amendment claim. We
accordingly leave to the district court on remand the task of considering
this issue in the first instance.

3. Did Kugler Cause Rodriguez's Injury?

In granting summary judgment to Kugler, the district court did not
consider whether Kugler caused the Eighth Amendment violation. The court
did not need to consider that question because it determined that there
was not enough evidence to show that Kugler actually knew about the
substantial risk of serious harm facing Rodriguez. On appeal, however,
Kugler asks us to affirm the district court's judgment on the ground that
he did not cause the violation. For the reasons stated below with respect
to Johnson, we reject Kugler's argument because the record contains
evidence from which a reasonable juror could find a causal connection
between Kugler's actions and the Eighth Amendment violation.

B. Judgment as a Matter of Law to Johnson

1. Did Johnson Actually Know Rodriguez Faced a Substantial
Risk of Harm?

Johnson argues that he did not actually know that Rodriguez faced a
substantial risk of serious harm. Johnson says that Rodriguez's
complaints were too vague to trigger his Eighth Amendment duty to act.
The evidence Rodriguez presented at trial, however, tells a different
story. That evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find
that Johnson actually knew that Rodriguez faced a substantial risk of
serious harm. We thus reject Johnson's argument to the contrary.[fn16]

Rodriguez testified at trial that he first spoke with Johnson about his
fear of being released into the compound on March 28. On that date,
Rodriguez told Johnson "[t]hat I was afraid for my life and that I
Page 621
didn't want to go out to the compound and that he should give me
protection and give me a transfer" to another institution. Trial Tr. I at
104-05. Rodriguez spoke to Johnson again at the April 3 Classification
Review meeting. At that meeting Rodriguez "told the colonel that I didn't
want to be released to the compound because . . . I was afraid that other
inmates would attack me, that I wanted for him to give me a protection
and a transfer." Id. at 105. On at least one occasion, Rodriguez
specifically told Johnson that some member or members of the Latin Kings
had issued a death threat against him. Id. at 123. Rodriguez "told him
[Johnson] that I was a . . . retired gang member and that the Latin Kings
wanted to attack me because I didn't want to continue being a Latin
King, and that that was one of the reasons why I wanted protection at
Everglades, because there were an excess amount of members of that gang
in there." Id. Rodriguez told Johnson that "all the members were sending
me messages . . . [and] [w]hen I went past, they would shout at me,
telling me they were going to kill me." Id. at 139.

Johnson argues that no reasonable juror could conclude from this
evidence that Rodriguez communicated to Johnson "specific facts from
which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists." Appellees' Br. at 17. We disagree.

Johnson relies exclusively on our decision in Carter v. Galloway,
352 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir.2003), to support his argument that Rodriguez's
complaints were too vague to put Johnson on actual notice of a
substantial risk of harm. Carter does not help Johnson. In Carter an
inmate was stabbed with a shank by a fellow inmate with whom he had been
placed. The inmate then sued various prison officials under the Eighth
Amendment for failing to prevent the stabbing, arguing that he had made
the officials sufficiently aware of the risk of harm, yet they failed to
act. We rejected the inmate's claims on the ground that the comments he
made to the officials were too vague to show that the officials had
"actual knowledge" of a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 1350.
Specifically, we noted that the only complaints the inmate made to prison
officials were that the attacker-inmate (1) paced his cell like a wild
animal, (2) wanted to fake a hanging in order to secure a transfer, and
(3) told the plaintiff-inmate that he would help the attacker-inmate
carry out the fake hanging "one way or another." Id. at 1349. In
rejecting his Eighth Amendment claims, we expressly relied upon the fact
that the inmate never told prison officials that he "feared" his
attacker, never told them that he had been "clearly threatened," and
never asked to be placed in "protective custody." Id. at 1349, 1350. In
short, we concluded: "Plaintiff has failed to establish that either
Defendant had a subjective awareness of a substantial risk of serious
physical threat to Plaintiff." Id. at 1350. Carter is thus easily
distinguishable on its facts.

Here, unlike in Carter, Rodriguez told Johnson the following specific
information: (1) that he was a former Latin King who decided to renounce
his membership; (2) that members of the Latin Kings had threatened to
kill him when he returned to the compound in retaliation for his
renunciation; (3) that the compound at ECI was heavily populated with
Latin Kings; and (4) that, in order to prevent an attempt on his life, he
needed either to be transferred to another institution or to be placed in
protective custody. These are the things that the inmate in Carter did not
do.[fn17] A
Page 622
reasonable juror could find from this evidence that Johnson actually knew
that Rodriguez faced a substantial risk of serious harm.

Accordingly, we conclude that there was a "legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable juror to find for [Rodriguez]" on the
subjective component of his Eighth Amendment claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a).

2. Did Johnson Respond Reasonably to the Known Risk?

As he did with respect to Kugler, Rodriguez argues on appeal that
Johnson responded to the threatened risk of harm in an objectively
unreasonable manner. But (as in the case of Kugler) the district court
did not address this question, given that it granted judgment as a matter
of law to Johnson solely on the basis that Johnson did not cause the
Eighth Amendment violation. Moreover, Johnson does not argue on appeal
that his response was reasonable. Because it is not necessary for us to
do so, we decline to address the objective component of Rodriguez's
Eighth Amendment claim. We accordingly leave to the district court on
remand the task of considering this issue in the first instance.

3. Did Johnson Cause Rodriguez's Injury?

The district court granted Johnson judgment as a matter of law solely
on the basis of its determination that Johnson did not cause the Eighth
Amendment violation. Johnson could not have caused the violation, the
district court reasoned, because he did not have final authority at the
April 3 meeting to order Rodriguez's release from close management. That
lack of authority was dispositive of the issue, the district court
concluded, because it was Rodriguez's release from close management that
"caused" him to be in the general population where he could be attacked
by Arnold Cleveland. In other words, in the district court's view,
because Johnson did not have the authority to order Rodriguez's release,
it necessarily followed that Johnson's actions could not have caused the
subsequent injury. We disagree with the district court's narrow view of
causation because it is inconsistent with our precedents in this
context. We therefore vacate the judgment as a matter of law entered in
favor of Johnson.

For purposes of determining whether Johnson caused the Eighth Amendment
violation and Rodriguez's subsequent injury, the "critical" question is
whether Johnson was "in a position to take steps that could have averted
the stabbing incident . . . but, through [deliberate] indifference,
failed to do so." Williams, 689 F.2d at 1384. To determine whether
Johnson caused Rodriguez's injury, we look at his "duties, discretion and
means." Id.

Applying the concept of causation spelled out in Williams, we held in
LaMarca v. Turner that a plaintiff demonstrates the "necessary causal
link" in this context where he is able to show that the prison official
(1) "had the means substantially to improve" the inmate's safety, (2)
"knew that the actions he undertook would be insufficient to provide [the
inmate] with reasonable protection from violence," and (3) had "other
means □ available to him which he nevertheless disregarded."
995 F.2d at 1539. Here, the record evidence is sufficient to permit a
reasonable juror to find that the "necessary causal link" has
Page 623
been established.[fn18]

First, there is no doubt that Johnson, the chief of security at ECI,
had the means substantially to improve Rodriguez's safety. Kugler
testified (in his deposition that was introduced at the trial) that if an
inmate voiced a life-threatening security concern to him, he was fully
authorized to set in motion procedures to place the inmate in immediate
administrative confinement and initiate a protective management review
aimed at eliminating the risk of harm. That course of action "could have
averted," Williams, 689 F.2d at 1384, the life-threatening risk of harm
facing Rodriguez because it could have resulted in Rodriguez's transfer
from ECI. Indeed, as Kugler testified, if as a result of protective
management review "he was deemed to need protection, he would have been
put in for a protection transfer." Trial Tr.I at 223.

Second, a reasonable juror could conclude from the evidence that
Johnson "knew that the actions he undertook would be insufficient to
provide [the inmate] with reasonable protection from violence." LaMarca,
995 F.2d at 1539. The evidence in this case supports such an inference
because the only action Johnson took in response to Rodriguez's requests
for protection was to recommend that Rodriguez be returned to the
compound — where he would have no protection at all from the Latin Kings
who had threatened his life.

Third, the fact that ECI had an established protocol for handling an
inmate's life-threatening security concerns — immediate administrative
segregation, combined with a thorough protective management review —
demonstrates that Johnson had "other means □ available to him which he
nevertheless disregarded," LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1539, and that those
means were means that "could have averted," Williams, 689 F.2d at 1384,
the substantial risk of serious harm facing Rodriguez.

We are satisfied that the evidence in this case is sufficient to permit
a reasonable juror to find the "necessary causal link" between Johnson's
actions and Rodriguez's injury.[fn19] Because we are unable to say that
"there [was] no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable
juror to
Page 624
find for [Rodriguez]" on the issue of causation, Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), we
must vacate the judgment as a matter of law entered in favor of Johnson.
[fn20]

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we vacate both the summary judgment
entered in favor of Kugler and the judgment as a matter of law entered in
favor of Johnson and remand the case to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED.